By: Hani Suleiman
As part of its review of the nuclear deal with Iran, US President Donald Trump has imposed financial sanctions on Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) for alleged links to terrorism, and perhaps the Revolutionary Guards’ particular competence to be covered by the sanctions,, Its capabilities, and its roles, and also raises a question as to the extent to which those sanctions to reduce the influence of the Guard.
Notes in origin and composition
One of the most important secretions of the Iranian Revolution is that Khomeini established the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) in order to protect and consolidate the revolution in the face of internal and external enemies, primarily the unreliable and loyal army of the old regime headed by Reza Pahlavi.
The United States is the main enemy of the Iranian revolution.
One of the options of the revolution at that time was either the replacement of the regular army’s soldiers and the change of its will and composition, which was excluded by the leaders of the revolution, or the establishment of a “parallel militia” alongside the populist forces in the Basij, Since the establishment of the Revolutionary Guard, there has been a problem of “legitimizing” its existence. It has been constitutionally legalized by Article 152 of the Constitution, concerning the establishment of the Guard, its functions and functions, including the export of the Iranian Revolution. As well as a separate law on the status of the Revolutionary Guards.
Since then, the Guard has become of a different quality, since it is not a traditional institution, as in many countries, such as regular armies. For example, it cannot be considered a non-state actor because its conditions have been codified in one form or another, It is subordinated as a kind of parallel armies or revolutionary armies, or ideological armies.
Guard position in the structure of the political system
Since the revolution, the Guards have been assembled indiscriminately in the form of a poorly trained and organized militia. However, during the years of war against Iraq, the Revolutionary Guard became a regular military apparatus. Since the end of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict in 1988, The Revolutionary Guard chose a defensive military role for itself, with some civilian reconstruction tasks.
The Revolutionary Guard penetrated in “Rafsanjani” phase and managed to harness a large part of the Iranian economy to its advantage.
In the Ahmadinejad era, there was a great deal of political empowerment of the Guards’ appointed leaders and leaders. The Revolutionary Guard headquarters and institutions became a dominant economic force, this situation has many contradictions on the Iranian economy.
The IRGC has extensive influence in the structure of the political system, where it has come to dominate the appointments of personnel in other institutions in Iran, to identify and intervene in their activities, including the regular military establishment, and to appoint some former or current guardians to important government posts.
The Revolutionary Guard became more cohesive, but its increasing unity did not translate into a more professional spirit. The Guard remained a radical organization in all its aspects, and its intervention in politics was not because small factions were out of control but because of its ideological extremism throughout the organization.
The Guards’ ability to control war strategy with Iraq throughout the conflict, and to build operations and actions The Guards have never hesitated to exploit differences between civilian leaders in order to direct policies in an extremist direction. This is evident in the Guard’s policies against the United States of America, and the differences between the Revolutionary Guard commanders, Muhammad Ali Jafari, Has launched a violent attack against Ruhani on several occasions, in particular the nuclear agreement.
Extended external role
The role of the Guard is not limited only to internal capabilities and activities, but also to an external influence in Iranian foreign policy and influential issues. For long periods, Lebanon has been the main arena for Iran’s efforts to export the Islamic Revolution. The Guard has exercised its hard-lines views, and its close ties through the provision of training and even direct military support to Hezbollah on many occasions have reached an extended strategic alliance, 2006 against Israel, and with the role of the party in Syria since 2011, where he led the Quds Force, the military wing of the Guard, most of the operations on the ground, in coordination with the Syrian regime, especially in the battle of Aleppo.
The Guard’s influence extends to the Iraqi interior, where the long guard forces had a strong presence after 2003, which gave Iran considerable political influence in the Iraqi scene, which greatly influenced the idea of establishing the “popular mobilization” forces from the experience of the Revolutionary Guards. The influence of the Guard is also widespread in Yemen, with the support of the Huthis, for further pressure on the Gulf and the Saudi regime and its siege, to the benefit of Iran.
In addition, there have been many previous experiences in which the Revolutionary Guards harassed US ships and forces, particularly in the Gulf of Aqaba, which contributed to increasing tensions and escalating hostile rhetoric from both sides. In addition, the Revolutionary Guards are threatened as one of Iran’s most important tools for Israel through its influence in Syria and the region.
Military quality capabilities
Despite the existence of Iranian army, the Guard monopolizes control of missile systems, oversees armament plans, Iran’s nuclear program and has the upper hand in military and fateful decisions in Iran. As well as possessing quality weapons, naval fleet and independent aerial capabilities.
The Revolutionary Guard is equipped with ground and naval forces, its air force and intelligence, as well as Special Forces.
It includes 90,000 regular soldiers and about 300,000 reservists. The IRGC has several types of weapons, including missile systems capable of carrying cluster warheads, tanks, fighter planes, and a large proportion of the IRGC’s arsenal is a domestic Iranian manufacture.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s range of missiles ranges from long-range to medium-range missiles, such as Shahab, Raad, Khaybar, and fighter jets such as twilight and lightning, and tanks such as Tuzan and Zulfikar, as well as a fleet of submarines such as Tariq and Al-Subah.
It is noteworthy that there have been many previous experiences by the Revolutionary Guards to harass ships and US forces, specifically in the Gulf of Aqaba, which contributed to the increase of tensions and the escalation of hostile rhetoric from both parties.
An economic empire
The IRGC has a powerful and powerful economic empire inside Iran, through many of the Guard’s subsidiaries in different and diverse fields. Which led to direct confrontations between Rouhani and the Guard in a struggle for economic capabilities, where the Guard is the third economic power in the country, and the rate of control over economic activities between 30-40%. He also manages nearly 100 companies worth nearly $ 12 billion and employs some 40,000 people.
The Khatam Al-Nabi’een Foundation owns about 800 subsidiary companies, through which it obtained thousands of official contracts to execute projects.
As well as its gains from the use of Iranian seaports for the export of arms, and the manipulation of sanctions by the Iranian regime, including Admiral, the shipping company from which arms smuggled to Yemen, and Hafez Doria Arya Maritime, as well as Al-Fajr.
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