AL-QAEDA AND THE MYTH OF REBRANDING

Long before Daesh (ISIS) gained global prominence in early 2014 when it drove Iraqi forces out of key cities in its western Iraq offensive, followed by its capture of the city of Mosul and the Sinjar massacre, prominent American and British analysts and commentators have been revamping Al-Qaeda’s image as a salafi group. In 2010, Colonel John M. ‘Matt’ Venhaus, US Army, in a report published by United States Institute of Peace, titled “Why Youth Join Al-Qaeda?”, wrote that ” Interviews and personal histories of 2,032 ‘foreign fighters’ show that rather than be recruited, young men actively seek out al-Qaeda and its associated movements.”  Colonel Venhaus went on to say” Al-Qaeda is more than just an organization; it is an ideology and a popular global brand that spins a heroic narrative with an idealized version of Islamic jihad.”

Since then, many journalists, commentators and analysts in US and UK followed Colonel Venhaus’ suit.  This is to say that, when a commentator like Political Scientist from RAND, Colin P. Clarke, compares the so-called “al-Qaeda’s attempts at moderation” to ISIS’s “Scorched Earth Approach” as shown in its  “uncompromising strategy of sectarianism, barbarity and conquest”, in a commentary titled “The Moderate Face of Al-Qaeda,  he is not simply using Daesh as a foil to highlight what he suggests is “a moderate alternative” offered Syrians, Iraqis and the rest of the Muslim world by al-Qaeda. Actually, he is taking up a line of argument that has been gaining popularity, especially with think tanks like Rand Corporation and many media outlets like CNN, The Associated Press and the Washington Post.  Meanwhile, the leading British news agency Reuters has been talking of ” Al-Qaeda’s ruthlessly pragmatic approach” seeking to ” legitimize itself as an armed force and, increasingly, as a viable political player”.

Behind all this lurks the illusion that al-Qaeda leader and ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri who had been seen for more than fifteen years as a marginalized figurehead lacking bin Laden’s charisma, unable to control the al-Qaeda affiliates, unable to launch major international attacks, and failing to take full advantage of the violent disruptions of the Arab Spring, is now displaying a sense of practicality, pragmatism and adaptability.

Based upon these misconceptions, it is now widely believed in the US and UK that al-Zawahiri, keen on retaining international relevance, survival and sustainability, has developed a new world-view.  In this new world view, the “far enemy”, which is the Western world, is still a priority, and will always be targeted by al-Qaeda, whereas the terrorist group’s emphasis on the “near enemy” which is the ruling elites in the Muslim World, has been renewed.

This means, so the argument goes, that al-Zawahiri seeks to create safe bases across the Muslim World for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. But al-Qaeda will not be directing or planning attacks on Western soil. There will, probably, be exceptions like the plot by the so-called Khorasan group, an al- Qaeda- linked militant faction based in Syria, to attack Europe or the United States.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda affiliates will concentrate on their fight against Muslim governments. In Syria, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra jncoupled from al-Qaeda in July, 2016, and changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, with al-Zawahiri’s top assistant helping the de-linking. The aim of this process was to focus the organization’s efforts on the fight against al-Assad regime and draw closer to other militant groups fighting in Syria.

Notwithstanding Colin P. Clarke’s commendation for al-Qaeda, one would wonder why he should write the following words:

“Next year, 2018, will mark the 30-year anniversary of al Qaeda’s founding. Its ability to establish widespread political legitimacy through a refurbished image could very well propel the group through its third decade and beyond.”

Is this good or bad news?