Why did Al-Qaeda failed to control Syria?

Successive losses enduring for the extremist groups and terrorist organizations deployed in Syria due to its siege and stranglehold on them as a result of the intensification of the fighting against them by various parties like:

The Syrian regime, the Free Syrian Army, and Turkey, which is leading the Operation Euphrates Shield, to weaken the Kurdish parties, which confused these organizations, and put them in a difficult strategic predicament, forced them to adopt what is known as the” disengagement “, which dispelled the allegations of terrorists in establishing a Muslim state.

The strategic predicament faced by terrorist organizations, the conflict between its leaders and the dispersal of its elements in many countries of the world,  has made it a very serious threat to global security in general and to the European world in particular. This has led the Western public opinion to study, understand and analyze the overall context of these changes, especially after the political and security complexities in Syria became very complicated.

The American researcher Charles Lister, who is director of the counterterrorism and extremism program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, has prepared a study entitled “How did Al-Qaeda Lost Control in Syria: The Internal Story”. He sought to track the shifts in the relationship between the terrorist organizations that have emerged over the last two decades, as well as monitoring of al-Qaeda’s efforts to support its image as a jihadist movement with popular extensions, and how the organization failed to achieve this goal due to the growing up of events and their complexity.

The study confirms that the failure of the attempts of al-Qaeda to integrate in recent years; represented, a coup against the organization in terms of loyalty and belonging, and this was embodied by Al-Nusra Front, whose leaders adopted a series of attempts to break away from al-Qaeda.

At the top of the list of those leaders Saleh Al Hamwi, who was expelled from the organization in July 2014 because of his adoption of the so-called “progressive vision”. The same applies to Abdullah al-Sindi; both saw this is the time to disengage from al-Qaeda and focus on the Syrian interior.

The actual attempts at the disengagement process were initiated by Abu Hamed al-Julani, the leader of Tahrir al-Sham (Levant Liberation Committee), along with a number of prominent leaders outside Syria. He led negotiations with Issam Mohammed Taher al-Barqawi, known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, senior of al-Qaeda leaders in Syria, including Abdullah Mohammed Rajab Abdulrahman, nicknamed “Abi al-Khair al-Masri”, an Egyptian jihadist who has close ties with al-Zawahri, as well as Khaled Mustafa al-‘Arori, Nicknamed “Abu al-Qassam”, and Ahmed Salama Mabrouk, Nicknamed “Abu Faraj”.

Accepting the Disengagement 

 Indeed, the idea of  “disengagement” from al-Qaeda was discussed at an expanded meeting of Al-Nusra Front’s Shura Council on July 23, 2016. The meeting ended with the approval of a number of leaders on the idea. In an audio statement published by the media, Abulkhair Al-Masri expressed his blessing for this step on 28 July 2016 – five days after the meeting.

In an audio clip, al-Zawahri stressed the need to ignore the organizational links if necessary. This meant al-Qaeda leader agreed to the idea of disengagement, after that al-Julani, Atwan, and Abu Al-Faraj appeared in a video clip, announced the dissolution of Al-Nusra Front, and the establishment of Fatah al-Sham, and also form a unified body in Syria. The spokesman of those leaders announced the full separation from al-Qaeda with a future focus on the Syrian interior.

The disengagement was not welcomed by a number of the organization’s leaders, such as Iyad al-Tubasi, nicknamed Abu Jleibib, a former assistant to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who publicly resigned in August 2016, protesting the disengagement from al-Qaeda.

The same behavior was adopted by two other senior leaders of the organization: Bilal Khreisat, nicknamed “abi khdyj al’urduniy”, the legitimate official of ” Ansar Al-Furqan ” and “Abi Hajar al’urduniy” who joined Al-Nusra Front  in early 2012. Sami Al-Aridi, the leader in Al-Nusra Front, also resigned – but refused to take any responsibility, this is the same position taken by 11 other leaders.

In late September 2016, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a letter entitled “We will fight them,” expressed his anger at the situation, pointing out that this step will lead to more differences, stressing that “disengagement” can only happen after the establishment of an Islamic state, and until then it needs the approval of the entire “Shura Council” in Al Qaeda.

At the same time, the role of communication with Iran emerged through senior al-Qaeda leaders living in Tehran, such as Salah Zaidan, known as Saif al-Adl, Abdullah Ahmad Abdullah, nicknamed Abu Mohamed al-Masri, and the latter rejecting the “disengagement”.  Abu Jleibib’s resignation led to some tensions. He formed a pro-al-Qaeda faction to undermine the authority of al-Julani. Abu Jleibib tried to return to Syria to do coordination missions. He called for the transfer of al-Qaeda followers from southern Syria to Idlib to oppose al-Julani. The presence of Abu Jleibib was an obstacle in al-Julani road.

In his study, the American researcher Charles Lister goes on: “How did al-Qaeda lost its control of Syria: the internal story” in tracking the fate of the idea of   disengagement Al-Nasra Front with al-Qaeda, highlighting the most important factors that led to the move.

The study concluded that the involvement of al-Zawahri in the scene of armed action in Syria, in turn, represented a pivotal moment in the events, which showed the extent of the division of the global jihad movement because of the complexity of the events in Syria.

This caused fragmentation of the extremist organizations by senior leaders such as Usama al-Aridi and Abu Jleibib, especially as they were heading towards the globalization of the global jihad movement on one hand, and another trend that clung to the need to retreat in the local sphere led by Mesir Ben Ali Jabour al-Jubouri nicknamed as “Abu Mariah Al Qahtani” on the other hand, and the trend led by al-Julani sticking to the balanced solution, which tried to reunite the movement locally and externally.

Negotiations with Turkey

 It is noted that al-Julani did not benefit from this division – as the study mentioned ; because his position in north-west Syria seemed more serious; after seeking to negotiate with Turkey in October 2017, to secure his position in the case of Turkish troops incursion into Idlib.

The mediation efforts in December 2017 and October 2018 resulted a short-lived agreement, which in turn complicated the situation and the accumulation of threats to the “counter-terrorism” process, as the “terrorists” continued to control the region with an army of 1,200 fighters.

These developments, in turn, have been reflected in the intellectual arguments related to the necessities of fighting, which have eroded the common sense of internal identity, which has also weakened the strength of these factions.

Al-Julani resorted to some figures close to Shura Council to justify fighting against the other “jihadist” factions. In July 2017, Fatah al-Sham became the dominant faction in north-west Syria, coinciding with the decline of Ahrar al-Sham, which elected Hassan Sufan in October to be the leader of the group.

This study overlooked the role of the West in the transformations that occurred in the structure of terrorist organizations and its dynamic track; it was limited to the narrative of the dynamic track of the process of “disengagement”, and reaction of opponents of that step, far from analyzing the general context surrounding those organizations and the support of some regional powers to a number of armed factions that were associated with interests with those regional powers.

For example, Turkey was the last gateway for those in the battlefield to transfer alongside the ranks of terrorists, according to the confessions of the majority of arrested fighters.

Number of international uncovered the role of a number of Western intelligence in facilitating and supporting the process of “disengagement”; which makes this Study as an attempt to read the situation.