Al-Qaeda’s alliance and secession tactics

Hamed El-Mossalamy

Daesh’s ideological secession from al-Qaeda was based on different environments around the two organizations. There has been no Shiite groups posing a threat to al-Qaeda, which focused its operation son the US and Zionist targets. However, Daesh, which emerged in Iraq, targeted Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

Introduction

The study of alliances and secessions among the takfiri groups is of key significance to realize the reasons for these alliances and secessions. The reasons vary from ideological to political drivers due to competition to get influence, authority, land and wealth.

The reason might a political tactic to ensure the survival of the organization.  For example, the Muslim Brotherhood, from which all of the Islamist groups emerged across the world, is considered to be the parent organization of all Islamists.

In the 1970s, some groups, such as the Brotherhood, opted for political compromise with the regime and worked on recruiting followers until they reach power.

Other groups like Al-Jihad and Takfir wal-Hijra opted for confrontation against the state.

Al-Qaeda organization, which has become the world’s leading jihadist group after September 11, has made many alliances with a number of groups worldwide. The organization has been amenable to a number of secessions since 2013 after Daesh seceded.

Consequently, other groups seceded and joined forces with Daesh, which has become al-Qaeda’s rival in jihadist operations.

This study delves into the tactical nature of these alliances and secessions and its reasons. It will focus on al-Qaeda, which has developed the jihadist operations since 2011 from a number of perspectives.

1. Al-Qaeda’s history

There are a number of reasons for alliances with al-Qaeda, which dates back to 1979 after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to back the 1978 communist coup there. The US declared a war by proxy on the Soviets in Afghanistan.

A number of Arab and Muslim countries cooperated with the US, whether by sending men to fight or by arms and logistic supplies. The Afghan Arabs, who are jihadists that migrated to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, emerged on the scene.

The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. A civil war in Afghanistan erupted among the mujahideen. However, Afghan Arabs did not take part in the Afghan civil war as they thought it was a sort of sedition.

Afghan Arabs started to return home, then term – returnees from Afghanistan — has emerged.

In 1993, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri headed to the Horn of Africa to launch alternative camps in Somalia in coordination with the Islamic Courts Union.

A number of returnees from Afghanistan managed to set up groups in their home countries. For example, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed a jihadist group in Jordan in 1993.

After his release from prison in Jordan, al-Zarqawi went back to Afghanistan and launched a new independent jihadist network back by al-Qaeda.

In 1998, Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, aka al-Qaeda, was launched.

2. Al-Qaeda’s alliance drivers

Al-Qaeda relies on a decentralized approach, linking branches to the center. The founders of new branches were often jihadists who traveled to Afghanistan and have strong ties with al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda organization is not necessarily aware of the details of operations carried out by its branches worldwide. It is only interested in the commitment of branches of the organization’s doctrines and the common enemy – the US and Zionist interests across the world.

Alliance drivers and motives

1. Ideological reasons

The ideological reasons and intellectual understanding are considered to be the fundamental pillar for alliance. It is a common ground for alliance.

With al-Qaeda’s decentralized approach, the ideological drivers are the fundamental for an alliance between one group and another working in different geographical areas.

Two types of allegiance:

• Individual allegiance to the group’s emir. The people outside the group are deemed to be apostates.
• Group allegiance, where one group gives the pledge of allegiance. For example, when Osama bin Laden gave the plegde of allegiance to Mullah Mohammed Omar, Taliban’s leader.

2. Political and tactical reasons

The political and tactical reasons are key drivers for alliances. They are divided into two types of factors as follows:

• Factors linked to al-Qaeda towards the globalization of jihad. Al-Qaeda organization, especially Ayman al-Zawahiri wanted to turn jihad into a global movement to target the US interests everywhere. Therefore, al-Qaeda set up many branches in Arab and African countries.
• Factors linked to the allied groups. There are a number of reasons that drive new groups ally with al-Qaeda.

1. Al-Qaeda is considered to be the forerunner of jihadist operations in the world, giving it a spiritual authority over new groups such as Al-Nusra Front in Syria.
2. Some groups consider al-Qaeda a means to draw attention, like Daesh in Iraq.
3. Propaganda as the name of al-Qaeda ushers in panic and fear.
4. Recruitment of new jihadists as al-Qaeda is deemed to be the pioneering jihadist organization in the world.
5. To get funding from individuals and countries, which support al-Qaeda.
6. To ensure consolidation of other jihadist groups, which adopt the doctrines of al-Qaeda, without organizational involvement with these groups.
7. Tactical reasons

The alliance in this case relies on a common enemy in the wake of state and security crackdown on the takfiri groups. On January 14, 2018, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, announced a jihadist alliance against the French-backed G5 Sahel, which is an international force made up of troops from Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

Secession reasons and drivers

The reasons include ideological, political and tactical drivers. Theoretically speaking, all groups seek survival. Dissident factions also seek survival, according to their own understanding, when they decide on seceding from an organization.

• Ideological reasons

These are the key factors leading to secession as follows:

1. Doctrinal differences: Daesh split from al-Qaeda for doctrinal differences, which led to deadly clashes between the two organizations in Syria.
2. Revisions: A good example of that was the revisions made by Al-Jihad and Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya in Egypt in the 1990s.

• Political reasons

There are a number of political reasons that cause secession such as the desire to gain political hegemony, rivalry to get financial resources and wealth, taking part in reconciliation conferences, and government-backed secessions, which include:

• Governments may recruit a spy to split these dissident groups. For example, a meeting was held on May 18,1942, between politician Amin Othman and the British authorities to back the Muslim Brotherhood and hire spies to closely monitor the Brotherhood’s activities.
• The government may pledge community reintegration of those who secede from the takfifri groups. Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed pledged community reintegration for those split from Islamist militant group al-Shabab and join forces with the government.
• Tough security crackdown may lead to revisions. Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya in Egypt, for instance, made hundreds of revisions. Nabil Naeem, Nageh Ibrahim, Karam Zohdi and other former leaders of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya cooperated with the state in working on the revisions.

• Tactical reasons

The tactical reasons include:

1. The survival of the group under tough security crackdown. Some groups secede from the parent organization to draw attention, support and political recruitment.
2. Giving pldge of allegiance to other groups. Nigeria’s Boko Haram seceded from al-Qaeda and has given pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of Daesh.

• Ideological & political reasons

Intertwined political and ideological factors may lead to secession. Daesh split from al-Qaeda in 2013 due to political and ideological reasons. The demographic reality in Syria and Iraq was different than Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Iraq is Shiite-dominated, and the Shiites seek domination after the ousting of former president Saddam Hussein in 2003. Alawites rule in Syria, which is of a Sunni majority.

The ideological split of Daesh from al-Qaeda was triggered by different environments. There are Shiite organizations rivaling al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Therefore, al-Qaeda completely targets the US AND Zionist interests.

However, Daesh was established in Iraq where Shiites are seeking political domination. Daesh also targets Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

Different enemies have clearly exposed the ideological differences between Daesh and al-Qaeda.

Conclusion

After overviewing the reasons and drivers for jihadist alliances and secession from a particular group, we conclude a general aspect of ideological organizations, especially the religious ones. These groups draw on alliances at times of security crackdown, while secession happens when they dominate.

This characteristic is a result of ideological and political drivers. Governments and the international community should draw on various mechanism to confront these organizations. On top of these mechanisms is the security and military confrontation, as well as blocking the funding and logistic support by individuals or countries.

At the same time, there should be rehabilitation initiatives for community reintegration and non-violence. Egypt’s model in this regard is a good example when the Egyptian authorities contained a number of Jama’a Al-Islamiyya members in 1980s and 1990s.

There also should be all-out intellectual confrontation aimed at the rebutting of all the takfiri doctrines, on which the ideological framework of all takfiri groups is based. There should a clear-cut answer to the question why some insurgent groups turn into terrorists and join the jihadist organizations.

For example, the Anyanya separatist movement emerged in South Sudan after the Sudanese government failed to fix neglect and marginalization of southern Sudanese regions. The civil protests and revolt turned into a civil war. It received support from Uganda and Israel until the emergence of the South Sudan Liberation Movement in the 1980s.

Therefore, we should fix the political, social and cultural reasons that usher in terrorism. Intellectual confrontation of violent ideologies, which are based on racism, exclusion of others and the legitimizing of killing, should go along with governments’ strategies to fragment these extremist groups and tear them apart from the inside for easier confrontation.