Future of Islamic groups in Libya

It remains uncertain whether major players in the war-ravaged Libyan state will manage to avoid military confrontation and consolidate their unity ahead of the general elections.

Introduction:

Libya plunged into a tragic power struggle in 2014 between the de facto government based in the eastern town of Al Bayda and backed by Tobruk-based Libyan National Army; and the National Salvation Government in Tripoli, which is supported by Fajr Libya Forces. The war broke out up after the NSG, which does not enjoy international recognition, attempted to establish its authority by overpowering its adversaries.

In addition to logistic and financial support from different regional and international powers, ideological differences fueled the internal conflict in Libya.  The tragic situation encouraged ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq, who refuse to return to their home countries, to seek safe havens in Libya.  Militant groups, whether belonging to ISIS or Al-Qaeda, sought to have strong footholds in this North African Arab country to confuse European and American intelligence operations to hunt for Jihadists who fled Syria and Iraq and disappeared in Libya. Retaliating, ISIS-linked terrorists managed to attack different European countries, including the Manchester attack in 2016.

A controversial anti-terror strategy adopted by the Libyan adversaries gave militant groups the opportunity to have stronger footholds in this war-ravaged country. Worse, a disastrous power struggle between major players in Libya, distracted their attention away from their major task in their country.

As a result, the success made by the government of National Accord in dismissing ISIS from its main stronghold in the Libyan city of Sirte, its sleeping cells remain substantial threat in different parts of the country. Likewise, although it was defeated in Benghazi and Darna at the hands of the Libyan National Army, Al-Qaeda-linked Ansarul Sharia is still causing a nightmare in Libya.

It was the Libyan Political Agreement signed in Skhirat in 2015, which gave birth to the Government of National Accord.

This study aims at analyzing factors and circumstances, which gave rise to Jihadist groups and helped them establish their strongholds in Libya. The study also seeks to explore the future strategies Jihadists would adopt in view of the major developments in Libya.

First-Factors, which gave rise to Jihadists

Due to the absence of central security institutions, Jihadist groups loyal to ISIS and Al-Qaeda moved to Libya and established strong footholds to escape pressure being mounted on them regionally and internationally. Pursuing this strategy, Ansarul Sharia forces seized the city of Benghazi in the wake of the fall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. ISIS did not lag behind; the terrorist group seized Darna in 2014 and Sirte in 2016.

Internal strife

The plight of post-Revolution Libya was mainly caused by the absence of central authority on the one hand and the rise of multiple military powers fighting to control the country and its enormous wealth on the other hand.

The parliamentary elections, which were held in 2014, did not help put out the flames of the civil war, especially after Islamists refused to take part. The Islamists rushed to form armed militias named Fajr Libya Forces when Gen. Khalifa Haftar launched the Dignity Operation. .

Backed by Tobruk-based elected parliament, Gen. Haftar’s army, in collaboration with the armed militias formed by the Libyan tribes, managed to retake the capital Tripoli after a fierce fighting against an army formed by rivaling tribes in Libya. A National Salvation Government was formed; but was not recognised by the international community.

The war between Haftar’s army and Fajr Libya Forces raged in different areas in Libya. However, an agreement signed in December in 2015 in the town of Sukhirat put an end to the armed conflict. The agreement also resulted in the formation of the Government of National Accord, which was backed by several armed factions, including the Guards of the Oil Installations, and rebel groups in the city of Misrata.

Libyan civil war created a security vacuum, which was exploited by Islamist groups to strengthen their relations with external powers. Ansarul Sharia fighters had the opportunity to receive logistic and financial support from their counterparts in Tunisia.

In the meantime, poor performance by the intelligence agencies, being unavoidable in the absence of a strong national army, made it too difficult to vet foreign nationalities arriving in Libya. In addition, there was no control on Libya’s mountainous borders, which were used by Jihadists as safe passages.

The chaotic security situation helped a small battalion of 800  fighters mobilised by ISIS to seize  the two cities of Darna and Sirte. In June, 2016, the Government of National Accord launched the Solid Structure Operation, which ended ISIS occupation of the two cities.

Using terrorism to sort out differences

Paradoxically, a miserable anti-terrorism strategy adopted independently by the two rivaling governments in the eastern and western parts of Libya, encouraged Jihadists, regardless of their small numbers, to cause enormous damage to the country after occupying several towns and cities.

According to this strategy, the two governments had to mobilise their forces against their political and military rivals alone—ignoring the threat of Jihadists. After settling scores, the winner(s) would receive the much-sought reward in the form of blessings from major international powers, which are deeply concerned that Jihadists in Libya would soon export their threats to their national security. Therefore, these international powers would throw their weight behind the Libyan faction(s), which managed to overpower ISIS-linked Jihadists across the country.  This strategy was used by the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad, which gave ISIS fighters access to opposition-held areas. The Syrian army advanced after the two sides exhausted themselves in internal fighting.

The power struggle between the Libyan governments in the eastern and western sides of the country offered an opportunity to ISIS to easily maintain control, short-lived nonetheless, on the two cities of Darna and Sirte in 2014 and 2015 respectively. ISIS was dismissed from its two strongholds at the hands of Al-Qaeda-linked Shoura Council of Mujahedeen in Darna, which was backed by Fajr Libya Forces in 2015.

Connectivity of Jihadist groups

Despite their hierarchical differences, Jihadist groups—and their offshoots—are sharing violent and radical ideology. Thanks to a sophisticated connectivity, they are ready to exchange support in the face of a common military threat. However, an exchange of accusation of blasphemy would engage these Jihadists in a tragic power struggle.

Jihadist groups also extend their contacts and connectivity beyond the borders. According to this strategy, Al-Qaeda-linked Ansarul Sharia in Tunisia lent their support to its Libyan counterpart when Libya plunged into chaos.  The Tunisia-based Ansarul Sharia sent leaders and military experts to open training camps in Libya. Ansarul Sharia in Libya rewarded their counterparts in Tunisia by sending a good supply of weapons.

 Migration of foreign fighters inside Libya

The defeat ISIS was dealt in Syria and Iraq has had a disastrous impact on the situation of security and stability in Libya. Fleeing the battlefields in these two Arab countries, ISIS fighters sought a safe haven elsewhere to take their breath and remobilize themselves. Geographical features of Libya with its vast aggressive desert, rugged mountains and porous borders represented the most favoured destination in this respect. In the meantime, the outbreak of fighting between local military forces encouraged ISIS fighters to land in Libya unchecked.

Due to geographical proximity, about 1500 Tunisian fighters crossed the border to take part in the raging battles in Libya. Tunisians constitute the majority of ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq. Jihadists from Sudan, Mali and Chad did likewise; they joined their Libyan and Tunisian counterparts in the Libyan territory to encourage more foreign fighters to come forward and join their ranks. Accordingly, Ansarul Sharia merged with both Raffallah el-Sahati battalion and Militias of Feb. 17 Martyrs to form the Shura Council of BenghaziFighters.

Second-Tracks Jihadist groups likely to run down in Libya

Despite several defeats they had had in Libya, Jihadist groups are posing a substantial threat not only to the sovereignty of the Libyan state but also to neighbouring countries. They are lurking in ambush to jump and hit when intellectual and social differences; and manipulations would get wider and more tragic. In General, there are three tracks, Jihadists in Libya are likely to run down:

First–Anarchy and growing strength

According to this track, Libya is likely to witness an upsurge in violence. The Libyan National Army appears to be determined to use force to resolve the conflict without resorting to a dialogue with either of the two governments: the Government of National Salvation  and the Government of National Accord.

The atmosphere in Libya is also likely to fuel bigger cycle of violence, especially after a government of national unity proposed in 2016 to limit the influence of Tobruk-based Interim government did not come to existence.

According to this scenario, ISIS-linked Jihadist groups or those tucking their heads under different banners, such as Ansarul Sharia;  will make use of instability and chaos in Libya to recruit bigger number of frustrated Libyan young men.

Jihadists will also strengthen their cooperation with human traffickers to help bring in fighters from African countries.  Receiving good financial support from its regional branch in Tunisia, Ansarul Sharia will have the opportunity to further their activities and operations across Libya. In the meantime, Ansarul Sharia will seek to bribe different low-profile Takferee groups dispersed in Libya to declare their loyalty and send reinforcements.

Ansarul Sharia will also avoid taking part in minor battles against rivaling groups. According to the theory of common enemy, Takfeeri and Jihadist groups would consolidate their unity to fight that common enemy and seize its weapons only to establish their authority and stimulate polarization and manipulation.

Moreover, the escalating chaos in northern Libya will give Jihadists and Takfeeris, fortified in southern parts of the country, the opportunity to escape and disappear in desert areas in North Africa. Strengthening their relations with Al-Tawareq nomads in northern Mali, the fugitives are likely to launch attacks on French interests in reprisal for the deployment of French troops in Mali in 2013.

Also, the Jihadist groups will have the opportunity to rebuild and reorganize themselves before establishing their global and regional headquarters in southern part of Libya. On the other hand, strongholds established by the Jihadists close to the Sudanese, Malian and Chadian borders, they will find it easy to call for reinforcements from different countries in Africa.

However, activities and operations by radical elements in northern Libya should not be overlooked. These groups may leave the theatre of conflict between rivaling governments to attack cities far off the volatile areas, such as Darna and Benghazi.   They will also have a plenty of financial supply by imposing taxes on helpless civilians there.

The radical groups are understandably giving special importance to the oil-rich area known as Oil Crescent in northern Libya. By seizing oil revenues and cooperating with international gangs undertaking this illegal business, these groups will have bigger financial resources to call for reinforcements to resist attempts sought to end their occupation of oil fields. It is known that armed militias allegedly formed to defend Benghazi had previously maintained a two-weel control on the Oil Crescent after defeating the Libyan National Army. .

Second track: retreat and extinction

Ending the threat of Jihadist groups in Libya is depending on how far the adversaries (the interim government in Tobruk; and the Government of National Salvation and the Government of National Accord in Tripoli) would go in their bid to settle their differences and turn a new chapter. A three-party dialogue is proposed to form a unified national government to supervise presidential and parliament elections in 2018. The elections will be held under the auspices of the Arab League, which is seeking to reactivate its role in resolving regional issues.  For certain reasons, the Arab League had called upon the UN Security Council to intervene in the Libyan problem after the eruption of anti-Gaddafi revolution in 2011.

New influential elites and players should also be invited to ascend the podium and help guarantee success to efforts underway to conclude national accord in Libya. Old faces, which exploited their suspicious relations with tribes to serve their interests, should disappear from the scene. .

In the meantime, the proposed government of the national unity should be empowered to command the military operations launched by the Libyan National Army, in collaboration with Fajr Libya Forces; and armed militias patronised by Fajr Libya Forces should be dissolved and integrated into the newly-formed Libyan national army.

Following the presidential and parliament elections, the political leadership should appoint new army generals to launch joint military operations to control the outskirts of strategic cities, such as Darna and Sirte, in which radical elements established their strongholds.

Once the army destroyed the strongholds of terrorists in northern and western areas of Libya, it (the army) should strengthen its relations with tribes in southern Libya before expanding its anti-terror war in this area. The heads of Libyan tribes in this area will provide fundamentally important logistic and intelligence help about the hiding places and training camps Jihadists loyal to ISIS and Al-Qaeda have set up in areas notorious for their aggressive geography and nature, such as Al-Makmam and Al-Horoug near Al-Kafrah.

By achieving these goals, the Libyan National Army will be given international credit; and consequently, an embargo on arms supply will be lifted. The Libyan National Army will be given credit to pursue its role in defending the country against Jihadist groups, which made Libya their regional base to launch attacks on neighbouring countries.

In order to accomplish its tasks and tighten its iron grip on the situation in Libya, the new Libyan army should upgrade its cooperation with the intelligence agencies of neighbouring counrties in general and Tunisia in particular, in which. Ansarul Sharia has its strongholds.

 The Libyan army should also cut the relations between Jihadists in Libya and human traffickers active in central Africa. By doing so, the terrorist groups will be denied the big supply of African human resources. A big number of African young people are seeking the opportunity to escape form economic hardships in their countries.

Nonetheless, ideological differences between the government of National Salvation and the Interim government will slow down the achievements of goals drawn up according to this track. Also, due to the fact that different Jihadist groups are receiving financial and logistic assistance from different donors and supporters, Libya will unavoidably stumble on more hurdles down this track. For example, Egypt and UAE are supporting the Libyan National Army; and Qatar and Turkey are the chief supporters of Fajr Libya Forces.

Third Track: stability and continuity

This track appears to be more realistic than the others. In other words, the Libyan National Army will have to maintain its firm control on the eastern region; and the two governments in the western side should maintain their control on the area. Each side seems to be bidding to strengthen its relations with external powers to support its stance during the forthcoming round of negotiations. Accordingly, the three major competitors will not have to fight terrorist groups as long as they (the terrorist groups) will not attempt to follow the example of ISIS or Ansarul Sharia in Darna, by seizing particular areas.

There is hardly any doubt that the Libyan National Army on the one hand and the forces mobilsied by the Government of National Accord on the other hand are separately waiting the opportunity to win the international recognition and domestic legitimacy by resisting any bid by a Jihadist group to occupy or threaten residential areas, irrespective of their size or strategic importance.

Also realising that it is too difficult for them to follow the example of ISIS, which declared an Islamic state in Sirte in 2016, these Jihadist groups may find itself compelled to act like Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan by strengthening their presence in the southern areas and launching attacks on carefully-selected targets nearby or far off.

Also ISIS-linked Jihadists and their lobbyists in Libya would plan reprisal attacks on European countries, which intervened militarily in the Libyan war. The Jihadists may also seek to copy Taliban tactics in Afghanistan, which is endeavoring to possess bigger land to support its stance during its negotiations with the Afghanistan government in Kabul.

Conclusion

Security solution can help defeat Jihadist groups militarily. However, intellectual confrontation is still needed to silence the  media machine operated by Jihadist and their propagandists.  This should mean that military confrontation will not alone eradicate the threat of terrorism, which has the intellectual potentials to rebuild itself and pursue its catastrophic aims. Comprehensive and integrated policies can provide better help in this respect and guarantee the achievement of better goals in the anti-terror war—especially if these policies appreciate the citizens’ aspirations and help improve their economic conditions. The proposed policies should also help preserve the human rights and civil liberties.

Civil societies and NGOs, which were marginalized before the revolution broke out in Libya, should rise and introduce future visions aiming at increasing the political awareness in society. Citizens should also be encouraged to resist violent ideology, which is alien to the Libyan people. Civil societies, in collaboration with NGOs, can also help monitor the performance of executive authorities. Civil societies can preserve their credibility and integrity by rejecting financial help from foreign circles.