The future of Muslim Brotherhood organisation in the Arab spring’s countries

“The organisation’s priorities were shredged and the organisation couldn’t adapt with the following subsequent strikes after it was prevailing in the post_Arab spring revolutions’ phase”.

Introduction:

The Muslim brotherhood organisation passed through many changes along the past decades.

The organisation often took an upward path in periods of political liquidity that accompanied the post-revolutions period; while it has taken a downward path in the stages of political stability that have always enabled Governments to fulfill their functions in the light of the possibilities available;

Which closes the door to the Islamic organisations to use the beneficial polarization of citizens through the network of social services provided by such organisations in response to the failure of the state’s institutions.

According to this, the Muslim brotherhood organisation is adapting a beneficial revolutionary ideology as a way of expanding and achieving its main targets of taking over all the Arab spring’s countries.

Despite the many political gains achieved by the organization – through its exploitation of the Arab Spring, which culminated in ruling Egypt in 2012 – but they have gone through a series of setbacks in a row after that which was represented in the Egyptians overthrowing the Muslim brotherhood rule in a popular revolution on 30 June 2013; in addition to the abandonment of the rule in Tunisia in 2014; following the failure to meet the popular desire to improve the standard of living.

It is possible to say that the Muslim Brotherhood organisation was characterised by its efforts towards universality. This was achieved through the subordination of the branches in different countries to the parent organisational branch in Egypt. In addition, the organisational link between the branches has made the organisation one bloc in the face of its intellectual crises, which were transferred from one country branch to another; as a result of structural correlations.

It also notes that the organisation has taken the Arab Spring as a means to strengthen its internal influence and deepen its popular presence by diversifying its political discourse, which combines civil and religious ideas, trying to attract all forces on the political scene. This study seeks to address the future of the organization in the light of events of the situation in the Arab Spring; as the political positions taken by the organization in a state affect the other branches.

The organisation’s future in Egypt

The Muslim brotherhood organistaion in Egypt faced alot of following organisational and intellectual crises

Since it was founded, the organisation has sought to be a comprehensive organisation of all life activities, including intellectual or physical activity, without realizing that the idea of a multi-tasking entity has negative aspects, the most important of which is the loss of ability to keep pace with modern changes.

Perhaps the idea of separating religious and political activity represented the major dilemma faced by the organisation and limited its credibility in the Egyptian street because of its use of religious activity to achieve political interests.

After the revolution in 2011, the Muslim brotherhood founded a political party which was not independent from the administrative structures of the organisation itself.

It was a normal thing for a citizen to accept the idea of a political party emerging from a religious institution with complete independence of the party; but for a religious movement to establish a political party with absolute control in its  political orientations and  choices; it means that the electoral votes have gone in vain; because it came in the hands of the non-voted for; this in itself is a kind of political deception, an expression of the authoritarian practice of the group as an internal mechanism to deal with its members.

The ideological stagnation of the organisation, as a result of the institutional centrality, has led to an upward path with the Egyptian state, as a result of the deliberate disregard of the youth’s proposals regarding the consolidation of the group’s advocacy activity and the renunciation of historical commitments inherited by the group, the thing that has also limited its ability to communicate politically.

Therefore, we find that all rapprochement attempts made by the state in order to put an end to the disorganised behaviours of the group, have been rejected because of the closure of the organisation on a number of inherited ideas, which necessitated the organisation to pursue a non-consensual pathway with other actors, which was a strong motive behind the large splits that hit the ranks of the organisation during the various periods of time.

In a related context, the refusal of the Muslim Brotherhood to join the unified popular vision that followed June 30 led to the mobilization of its members in different fields and use its organizational component with government functions; to cause administrative damage to the public affairs; through the disruption of government work, failure to fulfill the  citizens’ requirements in addition to intensifying the call for civil disobedience as an effective mechanism to confront the Egyptian state; this prompted the Egyptian state to try abort the organisations by declaring it a terrorist organisation, which helped to codify its efforts to assassinate it and arrest its cadres.

The organisation has never given up; it has sought to retrieve its old violent tools and has practiced aggressive behaviour against government institutions, especially in Sinai. This has been done through systematic terrorist attacks against the army and civilians by groups with ideological links to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although the group suffered similar blows in the 1960s after the assassination attempt of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, it managed to rebuild its organisational structure again under President Mohamed Anwar Sadat’s rule after he freed them from the prisons and dropped the judicial verdicts; to use them later to confront the Socialist Party and nationalists.

On the other hand, we find that the position of the Brotherhood on the political arena is now weaker than it was under the Sadat era; because of the way the current government is dealing with them, which refused – definitely – to open a new page with the organisation; so the possibility of their return to run the political experiment according to the government standards is nihilistic, not only because of the history of the conflict with the state; but because of the government’s refusal to the return of an organisation that is struggling the state in its local power.

In addition, the state has resorted to the draining of its financial resources by confiscating its funds as a threat to national security, limiting the ability to act on the ground after the organisation’s media arms were cut off; for these reasons, the Brotherhood can be described as the “clinically dead”; as it is banned from practicing its developmental political activity, which it introduced in the 1980s, in addition to its advocacy role that has accompanied it since it was founded.

Only the female members of the group and its young clans, have been left behind, they have no ability to rebuild the organisation again by a new horizon that enables them to attract effective popularity, especially after the organisation was isolated from the regional support it used to receive in its various crises.

As a result of all the recent crises, the Muslim Brotherhood has faced internal divisions among its youth, represented in Mohammed Montasser, the group’s spokesman, and Mohammed Kamal, a member of the Guidance Office, who led a rebellion against the first-rank leaders represented in Mahmoud Ezzat,

Deputy General Leader of the group Ibrahim Mounir Secretary of the International Organisation, and Mahmoud Hussein, Secretary General of the group.

Each team took the procedures against the other team by bringing it to the investigation after a number of mutual accusations. The youth group, which aspired to power, accused the first-rank team of intellectual rigidity and organisational seclusion that led the group to stand in the way of any attempt to develop; according to factual data, and this has caused the loss of political gains achieved after the revolution in 2011.

On the other hand, the first-rank leaders accused the youth group of trying to drag the organisation into violence and destroying the intellectual structure on which the group relied since its foundation. The idea of the rebellion is totally rejected within the organisation. Some of the young leaders may have adopted the revolutionary situation prevailing in Egypt at the time; within the organisation; as a rejection of how things were took place.

As a result of the strong disagreement between the two teams, internal elections were held in 2014. The so-called “Crisis Management Committee” was created, in addition to the Higher Administrative Committee, whose members were mostly from youth, then the new Shura Council was elected, which approved the separation of legislative and supervisory bodies from the executive ones; in an attempt to correct the status of the organisation, which was characterised by overlapping authorities; but the leaders of the «old guard» refused to recognise the new Shura Council; which has increased the crisis.

This crisis reflected the extent to which the organisation in Egypt has been flawed, and that it has become totally lacking its ability to define its local priorities because of the inconsistent patterns of intellectual heritage with youthful thinking that have been updated by post-revolutionary organisational interactions.

The organistaion’s future in Tunisia:

The effects of the crises in the Brotherhood organisation in Egypt did not go unnoticed by the branches of the regional organisation whose political status was not as good as the parent organisation.

In Tunisia, under popular pressure, and in an attempt to avoid the fate of the mother branch in Egypt, the organisation was forced to take over the political role and abandon religious activism, through an internal party vote; the process of abolishing the religious role was absolute.

This has generated condemnation within some circles of the movement, which considered that this action represents an end to the principles of the movement that relied on it since its foundation in the eighties of the last century as a means of socialization.

In addition, the Nahdha movement renounced power in 2014 after its failure to meet unbridled popular desires to improve its economic status. As a result of the fragile reconciliation alliance formed by the Renaissance with the parties of the Congress and the Democratic bloc under the name of the Troika, which was characterised by imbalance, not only as a result of ideological rivalry between the parties of the coalition; but – also – the result of the quota system, which was applied without balance; where Alnahda took prime minister with absolute powers, while Al-Moatamar took the presidency  with an honorary powers, Party bloc took the Chairmanship of the National Constituent Assembly.

The attempt of the organisation in Tunisia to export a civilian façade for its rule through its alliance with the civil forces failed because of its control over the main sources of influence in the ministries. Therefore, its media tools, whether partisan or governmental, failed to provide logical justification for the recession that hit the Tunisian economy at the time, because of the increasing deficit in the public budget; which posed a threat to the Tunisian government in fulfilling its financial obligations to its employees.

Therefore, the organization did not find a solution better than abandoning power as a means of escaping the danger it faced; and because the organisation is not leaving an opportunity without trying to exploit it for political benefit; it tried to market the idea of abandoning the government in its favour by showing itself as the saviour of the country from the chaos that was close as a result of the tension caused by the rule of AlNahda in the country.

In a related context, the Brotherhood sought to balance its parties, after the arrival of Baji, commander of the Sebsi to rule, in order to guarantee to himself an active participation in defining the priorities of that political phase,

especially since the leader Sebsi is a pre-revolutionary politician, which means that any alliance with him may lose more votes of revolutionaries in the upcoming electoral entitlements; because of the distortion that will affect the cadres; and therefore Al-Nahda  from time to time criticise the ruling regime of Tunisia; to prove its presence on the opposite side. Rashid Ghannouchi has already accused the ruling Party Neda’a Tunisia of trying to exclude other political forces and restore the one-party system.

The Muslim Brotherhood is facing a real challenge because of the increasing of establishing Islamic parties, which it will certainly share with it its traditional popular base, which has eroded after it enabled it to win the majority in the Constituent Assembly in 2012; In addition, the Salafiyya youth – an example of Hizb al-Tahrir, which was officially rejected by the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior in 2011 because of its religious tendencies that contradict the national entity – represents a significant threat to the popular base of Al-Nahda, Because of its polarising ability, and his reluctance to catch up on doctrinal errors, taking advantage of the state of lack of religious awareness of the citizen, which facilitates his alienation towards a particular ideology easily.

Thus, the Brotherhood organization in Tunisia has started to decline, especially after it turned into a political movement that shunned its religious authority, which has become the effective mechanism for mobilizing the Tunisian street.

The Party’s adoption of national slogans will not yield positive results, because the party’s historical aspect – which is rooted in the minds of the public – will prevent its ability to influence them, and national parties will struggle to exclude it from its traditional popular base.

The organisation’s future in Syria:

Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood has faced a number of problems which led the organusation to lose its popularity among the various social strata. Perhaps the problem of reconciling the national and religious tracks is the most important of these obstacles. The organization itself is confined to two points; either preserving its founding religious principles or pursuing a national path that might make it lose its traditional popular support.

On the military side, we find that the organization was integrated into the conflict through the movement of Ahrar Sham, which deepened the distance between it and the civil forces. The religious orientation of the movement has prevented the lifting of the flag of the Syrian revolution, and preferred to move under its own religious umbrella, flag is not just a canvas fluttering in the open air, but its large symbolism is specifying the orientation of whoever is carrying it.

This situation has several implications. The most important of these is that the organization is moving according to its own visions, defying the Syrian national consensus, in addition to its pursuing to take the Syrian revolution as a ride to ascend power; not because it believe in the revolution’s general concepts, also

The belief in the possibility of a consensus between the nationalist views of the Syrian revolution and the religious orientation of the movement has been lost. Its rejection of the revolution’s flag is an indication of its existence on the other side of the objectives of the revolution by establishing a civil state.

That is why the organization found itself isolated; having positioned itself deep inside the taxonomic box of the armed Islamist groups, neither the financial nor military support of its regional allies (Turkey and Qatar) helped restore its popular status to the pre-revolutionary situation.

Despite the return of the movement in 2017 to adopt some of the revolutionary slogans; however, this did not achieve their goal of restoring part of its lost legitimacy.

It is no secret that some members of the movement have split from it and announced their joining Al-Qaeda, which is fighting in Syria under the name of the “Sham Liberation Organization”; after the movement supported the conference of Astana without going to it in an attempt to avoid the internal clash between supporters and opponents of the conference; which revealed the extreme face of many of its members, and this situation revealed the weak internal cohesion of the movement, which made them adopt two situations at the same time; proving the weakness of decision-making mechanism within the movement.

At the political level, the organization established a political party in 2013 under the name of the National Party for Justice and the Constitution. The organization, through the establishment of this party, sought to draw quarterly lines from the growing Islamic radicalism in Syria because of the armed conflict. It is clear that the organization, like its other branches in the Arab Spring countries, is trying to occupy an intermediate position that enables it to communicate with all the political forces in Syria and enable it to participate in the Geneva delegations to find a solution to the crisis.

The party’s orientation resulted in a disagreement within the organization; conservatives saw that the party’s adoption of a nationalist speech would distance it from its traditional supporters of popular groups; while supporters believed that the success of the interim organization depended on its ability to be in a middle position between popularly rejected Islamic radicalism and secularism; thus they supported the idea of the Nationalist Party. Thus, we find that the organization has played twice; it has militarily converged with the radical Islamic forces, while its political wing has been disowned by adopting nationalist views.

In addition, the political situations of the organization have contributed to the diminishing of its social popularity, especially with regard to the situation on the occupied Golan; it has been noted that the organization does not intend any future clash with Israel for the liberation of the Golan; but it preferred a peaceful solution; which angered many of his followers who saw in this situation an attempt to get closer to the West, which has always claimed the movement’s struggle to confront him.

In the end, the Brotherhood has not been able to withstand much; especially with the successive defeats of the Syrian revolution in recent times; it has lost popular support because of its different political positions, which show a benevolent trend without any real concerns of the suffering of citizens.

The organisation’s future in Yemen:

The Brotherhood operates in Yemen through the Yemeni Rally for Reform Party, which participated in the Yemeni Popular Revolution according to its own agenda, before the Houthis staged a coup against the legitimate authority in 2015 which led Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia to lead a military alliance against them. As it represents a way out of the Houthi coup that contributed to the destruction of political life; thus hindered their attempts to control the joints of the state.

It is noted that the relationship of the organization in the coalition countries was characterized by mutual suspicion because of its loyalty to the parent organization in Egypt. The organization sought to overcome these suspicions by removing it from its international organizational commitments in 2016, claiming that despite it came out from the same ideological school of, its organizational structures do not establish any external party affiliations, and this has revealed an internal crisis among members of the organization, some of whom have resisted abandoning the historical constants, being their only means of finding an effective role in Yemeni society.

However, this act did not achieve its objectives; where the statements without action is considered a trick that aim to calm the relationship between the organization and the coalition countries which has always been considered to be as dangerous as al-Houthi. The media tool of the organization and the performance of its young cadres on the ground that are attacking the alliance have contributed to this idea.

The intellectual differences have also hindered the growing cooperation between the two parties despite the common threats of both of them and their adoption of unified visions regarding the future of unified Yemen.

The organization has linked its behaviour towards the alliance according to the alliance’s behaviour towards the international organization, which was conflicting; and therefore the organization believed that the rapid military solution will generate a confrontation against the alliance’s countries, while the slow solution may target its cadres because of a long-term dispute with Houthi.

On the other hand, the alliance’s countries believed that the Brotherhood is playing a discouraging role by failing to achieve military achievements on the ground despite the military support it received, the failure to liberate Taez city in the south of Yemen, in March 2015, from the grip of Houthi played a role in establishing this belief. This explains the successive arrests of the organization’s cadres in southern Yemen after failing to present itself as part of the solution in the north of Yemen.

Therefore, despite the decline in the popularity of the organization, but it is still an active force inside Yemen.

The organization’s future role is not only determined by it’s disengage organizational ties, but also by increasing cooperation with the Arab Alliance, which could provide a quick solution in Yemen.

Steps to rebuild confidence will certainly take a long time; but the indicators on the ground may contribute to pushing them forward, and this can only be achieved through military progress in the north of Yemen.

The organization’s future in Libya:

The status of the Brotherhood in Libya was no different from that of the other branches; the Libyan branch’s intellectual force was not strong like the other organization’s branches, despite the organizational link between them.

No need to mention that the political practice resulting from the historical legacy of the organization is few; as a result of its modernity as it was founded in the late nineties of the last century; therefore the organization relied on theoretical studies of the political experiences of the organization’s regional branches, trying to acquire the political knowledge that would enable it to deepen its political roots in the post-revolutionary period.

The internal unity of the organization was not strong enough to make its cohesion stand up against divergent visions on important political issues; a clear rift has emerged between members of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, on the Skhirat agreement signed in Skhirat, Morocco, in 2015, under the umbrella of the United Nations after it included all the conflict parties in Libya, trying to put in place a mechanism to end the Libyan civil war; at the begining the agreement was supported by the organization, which led a number of its members to split; but later returned to rebel against its output.

This rebellion was manifested by the refusal of the Libyan rescue government, which emerged from the National Congress, and is not recognized and dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, to the security committee set up by the National Reconciliation Government, and it announced that it will pursue a number of its elements, while the forces of the rescue Government controlled a number of security and government headquarters in 2017, the most prominent of which is the Ministry of Defense.

The ability of the organization to build effective relations with various popular components – labor groups or youth groups – was very limited; because of the domination of the Libyan regime in the pre-revolutionary phase, which deliberately limits their ability to communicate as a means of social isolation; therefore, in the post-revolutionary period, the organization was unable to build its own parallel world aimed at providing social services to citizens as other branches did in its surrounded region.

Moreover, the organization failed to demonstrate its acceptance of the other and its respect for women’s rights and its commitment to democratic values; the fact that its foundational goals contradicted with such idea, the international organization’s situations also supported the organization’s failure to overcome these points intellectually. This was evident in the popular rejection of this organization in the parliamentary elections held in 2014, which was won by the national and liberal stream; however, the organization has rebelled – later – on the results of these elections through the “Dawn of Libya coalition” which prompted the Constitutional Court in Tripoli to cancel the constitutional amendments that approved the election law, despite this, the international community has maintained its recognition of the Libyan parliament.

The organization did not lose sight of the importance of balancing its internal interactions with the contradictory political forces. These oscillating relations proved the absolute beneficiary of the organization and its lack of adherence to certain concepts or principles, the organization sought this policy to present itself as an effective mediator, as well as to benefit from intellectual differences between it and all factions; extremist organizations (such as the Shura Council of the Mujahideen of Libya) accuse it of loyalty to the civilian forces (such as the National Forces Alliance, which won the 2012 elections), which in turn accuses it of leniency with extremists.

In every political crisis that the organization undergoes, it regains its  middle position and its non-rooted differences with each faction; to enable its media to face the charges against it.

Therefore, the future of the organization depends on its submission to the electoral entitlements approved by the people, in addition to the renunciation of violence by staying away from the armed organizations, which provides the organization with media coverage to achieve its foreign agenda.

The conclusion:

The Muslim Brotherhood organization has suffered from clear setbacks following the rupture of the cohesion of the parent organization in Egypt because of the struggle of its leadership over power, which led to the formation of two opposing fronts, one in Istanbul and the other in London.

Although the organization has an internal regulation of its administration; however, this did not prevent the clash between the old guard and youth leadership, which believes that perhaps it is time to conduct an intellectual review of the contradictory organizational behaviour that has led to an unnecessary regional and international hostilities.

The organization’s ability to meet its external obligations has completely disappeared after the division among its members; because of the fragmentation of its organizational structures in Egypt; its work in the world as a whole has been hampered.

The idea of a rapprochement with the Shiite component in the Arab countries has been a concern for the Gulf States, which are suffering from the expansion of Iranian influence in the region. The Gulf States considered such a move as an obstacle to their local attempts to assimilate Shiite groups loyal to Iran, which is a thorn in the throat of its strong security because of its external links.

The priorities of the organization were fragmented after it could not cope with the successive attacks in its traditional places of influence. After it has proved its domination post-Arab Spring revolutions, its luster gradually faded after the active popular support, that enabled it to withstand the regimes before the Arab Spring , was declined.

The organization has relied on the failure of the Arab Spring countries. Its social network also helped it to take root in the fabric of the Arab societies, which did not have a real chance to find out the compatibility between the organization’s ideology and its practices on the ground, and such contradictory only came to the surface when the organisation took power.

The emergence of the Salafi da’wa – which pays great attention to the religious affairs and ignores political practice as a catalyst for the community division – has hampered the expansion of popular organization, which has always presented itself as a prophetic approach aimed at achieving moral integrity, We must not ignore the experience of the organization in the rule of the Gaza Strip. Although the Gaza Strip is the only place where the movement has been armed, it has proved the contradiction between the ideology of the organisation and the national state.

While the national state recognizes the right to use force only for itself, the organization – which established its own armed militia outside the national state – could not prevent other popular factions from following its path.

Therefore, we find that the Gaza Strip is full of armed factions, most notably the Qassam Brigades and the Saraya of Jerusalem, the army of the nation, and others; which means that in the case of any internal fighting as a result of differences of belief or the difference between the use of armed factions in dealing with political issues, this will cause a great destruction, and this confirms the conflict between the organization ideology and the national state.

In the end, the attempts reviving the organization again will be met with failure; as long as there is no separation between the religious call and political side, as the religious rules are fixed and devoid of any material benefit; while politics varies according to the military interest; therefore linking the two to each other contributed to the slow adaptation of the organization to the living conditions; which led the people to abandon it after war.