Morocco’s intelligence makes headlines at home and abroad

Ali Bakr, Expert on Jihadist movements

Morocco prides itself on its effective and overpowering counterterrorism strategy, which has been given credit regionally and internationally. Much of the success the Moroccan Jihadist-catchers have won in the anti-terror war is attributed to the newly-established Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations. Largely compared to the world’s intelligence superheavyweights, the CBJI’s undertakings include fighting organized crimes, The bureau also intervenes in the cases of terrorism, endangering the security of the state, kidnapping, explosives, and arms trafficking.

In an acknowledgement of its performance, the United Nations Human Rights Council, UNHRC, declared in its July report in 2015, that the intelligence apparatus in Morocco was the most powerful in North Africa and the Middle East.

It was in the wake of 9/11 attacks when the elite intelligence agencies across the world rolled up their sleeves more tightly than they should have done to face a harder and more complicated anti-terror task.

The 9/11 wakeup call was, nonetheless, sounded louder and a high-level cooperation and information exchange became fundamental in anti-terror war after the discovery that terrorism had evolved into a cross-border threat. Countries accused of terrorism-sponsoring provided Jihadists with counterfeited passports to beat border checkpoints.

Morocco’s CBJI also won regional and international credit after taking the cover off scores of clandestine cells and breaking up them before their elements would launch destructive attacks on strategic facilities and institutions in the kingdom. The sleeping cells were formed by Moroccan Jihadists, who fought in Syria and Iraq and were forced to return after the defeat of ISIS.

Morocco is surrounded by a jungle of Jihadists linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, who managed to have strongholds nearby after North African countries have plunged into political chaos and tragic insecurity that have been hitting the Arab region for years.  Jihadists, who returned from the war zones in Iraq and Syria, are prowling around in southern areas of Algeria, Tunisia, northern Mali, Chad and Niger. The threat of cross-border terrorism in North Africa is getting worse as a result of poorly-equipped troops guarding porous borders.  Nonetheless, Morocco remains the most stable in the region.

Researches and experts attributed the remarkable success Moroccan intelligence agencies won in their anti-terror war to thoroughly-planned policies as follows:

First-Exceptional efforts

In their anti-terror war, the Moroccan intelligence agencies are paying special attention to the political and security dimensions, which could help minimize the cross-border threat, especially after Jihadist groups gained strongholds in neighbouring countries to attack targets inside Morocco.  Morocco’s CBJI was put on high alert after a notorious Jihadist threatened that his fighters would launch attacks inside Morocco. In an audio recording released in May 2016, Abul-Walid al-Sahrawi gave the signal to his elements in the region to launch suicidal attacks on the UN observers of the referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO. Abul-Walid’s elements were also ordered to destabilize the kingdom and undermine the Moroccan economy by destroying tourist sites, security institutions and foreign investment companies in the kingdom.

However, Morocco remains impregnable; a series of preemptive strikes by the CBJI have defused the cross-border threat. Attempts by Jihadist groups active in Algeria, such as Jund al-Khilafa, to have strongholds in the kingdom were undermined.  Desperate to outmaneuver the CBJI’s incessant hunt, Jund al-Khilafa (soldiers of the Caliphate) changed its tactics by forming sleeping cells. Due to its efficient and powerful performance, CBJI succeeded in putting these cells under close scrutiny.

On September 6 this year, the Moroccan security authorities managed to break up one of these cells, which was active in the two cities of Tetouan and Agadir. According to DGED, acronym of Direction generale des etudes et de la documentation or the General Directorate for Studies and Documentation, three terrorists aged 25 and 26 were arrested. DGED also said that 12 potential terrorists were arrested in Tanja and Casablanca.

Two years before on September 16, the Moroccan security authorities given the clue from CBJI took the cover off an 8-member sleeping cell linked to ISIS and active in Fas and Tanja in northern Morocco. On October 3 the same year, the Moroccan intelligence service aborted a series of suicidal bombings when they arrested 10 Moroccan women. They confessed that they were planning suicidal bombings on different strategic facilities in the kingdom. Investigations also disclosed that the female Jihadists, who had sworn loyalty to ISIS, were planning to seduce young people into travelling to the war zones in Syria and Iraq to join the terrorist group’s fighters there.

The preemptive strikes dealt to sleeping cells by the CBJI included the arrest of a terrorist group named the Moroccan Jamaa Islamiya, which was responsible for the attack on Casablanca on May 16 2003.

The CBJI has also managed to break up Jihadist groups, which infiltrated the Moroccan borders and kept their activities in a shroud of secrecy by seeking hiding places in densely populated areas. Since 2015, Morocco’s powerful and effective intelligence apparatus has launched 63 preemptive strikes on clandestine cells formed by Jihadists to evade capture. They included 21 cells arrested in 2015, 19 in 2016 and 18 in 2017.  The Moroccan Jihadist-catchers also discovered that terrorists were tucking their heads under the cloak of religious institutions, student unions, and charity organisations launched in poor districts.

Second-Counterterrorism strategy in Morocco

Intelligence agencies in Morocco have drawn the attention of their foreign counterparts in Europe. Thanks to a security alert provided by the Moroccans, terrorist attacks planned against Belgium, Spain and France were defused in the proper time. In an acknowledgement of the Moroccans’ efficiency and professionalism in anti-terror war, European intelligence counterparts keenly upgraded their joint coordination and cooperation to deepen security and stability in EU. The Moroccan and European intelligence agencies also cooperated successfully to abort attempts by Jihadists to land on the European coast.

Two major Moroccan agencies, DGED and DST, are given the undertaking of protecting the kingdom from the cross-border threat. DGET is the external intelligence agency of Morocco, which also has some diplomatic prerogatives. DST, acronym for Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire or Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, is responsible for coordinating its anti-terrorism activities with the Interior Ministry.

Third- recruitment and penetration: The success of preemptive strikes launched by DGED and DST in this war is largely attributed to recruitment and penetration. According to these extraordinary counterterrorism strategies, some elements linked to Jihadist groups are picked and vetted thoroughly before they would be groomed for their extraordinary task: acting as moles to provide detailed information about the movements and activities of the parent group. The picks are no other than young people ISIS approached to manipulate them.

Expanding recruitment and penetration strategies in European countries, DGED and DST managed to reveal the identities of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Barcelona. The Moroccan intelligence agencies also cooperated with their French counterparts to  arrest the chief suspect behind the deadly attack on Bataclan theatre in Paris.

Fourth-Strong cooperation: Anti-terror strategy in Morocco is also based on a high-level coordination between different intelligence apparatuses. For example, the  Interior Ministry in Morocco is acting as the headquarters of five security agencies. They are the Directorate of General Affairs, which maintaind database of citizens in the country; the General Information Agency, which is responsible for closely following activities planned by political parties, including demonstrations, strikes and sits-in. The Ministry of Interior’s security hierarchy also includes the Directorate of Royal Affairs, which is responsible for the protection of royal facilities, establishments and royal guards. In the meantime, the ministry’s Directorate of Telecommunication and Frequencies Police is responsible for intercepting—after obtaining permission from the General Prosecution—suspicious mobile calls.

Thanks to a high-level cooperation and information exchange, anti-terror agencies in Morocco have made the headlines at home and abroad in recent years.

Commenting proudly on successes made by the CBJI and affiliated agencies, Abdelhak el-Khiam, Director of Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations, CBJI, disclosed that 43 terrorist cells had been dismantled since 2015. BCIJ’s director added that they had adopted a proactive approach to powerfully and effectively dealing with Jihadists disappearing at home or lurking in ambush in neighbouring countries.

The success, el-Khiam continued, achieved in this respect is also due to the CBJI’s preemptive strategy and detailed information about the Jihadists’ whereabouts at home or abroad. He asserted that CBJI is committed to dismantling terrorist cells before they move to action.

The top Moroccan security official revealed that there  are 1623 Moroccan fighters abroad, and that 400 others died in combat. “About 78 people came back from these war zones. We deal with these people according to the law. The first thing we do is to submit them to interrogations on why they left for these zones, as it is forbidden by Moroccan law, then they are transferred to the General  Prosecution for further investigations”.

Fifth-Overseas cooperation: Moroccan intelligence agencies are keen to maintain strong cooperation with their Western counterparts. For example, the information exchange with Spanish intelligence counterparts helped to abort terrorist attacks planned by Jihadist groups in both sides. The high-level and strong cooperation in this respect has also helped the Moroccan security authorities to defuse ISIS attempts to recruit young people in the kingdom and send them to the war zones in Syria, Iraq and Libya.

Also, overseas intelligence cooperation helped the Moroccans dismantle sleeping cells inside the kingdom before they would hit strategic targets. The broken cells included that, which was formed by Tunisian Jihadist Mohamed Ibn al-Hadi Masahel in March 2006. Masahel’s cell, which was linked to Al-Qaeda’s Salafi Jihadists in Algeria (formerly known as GSPC), planned to attack strategic targets in Europe, such as the underground tunnel in Milan and the Basilica of San Petronio, the main church of Bologna.

On the other hand, a tip-off from the Moroccan intelligence agencies helped their counterparts in Denmark to foil a suicidal attack on cartoonist Kurt Westergaard. The assassination attempt was planned by Al-Qaeda after the cartoonist lampooned Prophet Mohamed.

The CBJI also provided key information to the British security service about the identity of the perpetrators of the attack on 16 January 2013 on the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria by militants linked to al-Qaeda.

Early-warning system is one of the CBJI’s most successful technique in its anti-terror war. The technique has proven its success by frustrating recruiting tactics pioneered by ISIS, al Qaeda and other foreign-based extremist groups to grow their ranks.  Also, the CBJI possesses hi-tech facilities to survey the web and social media to track terrorist organizations since the latter use internet to spread their message and attract new recruits.

Phones are put under surveillance only when the General Prosecution authorizes it, and that these operations are conducted under its monitoring. Suspicious mobile calls are recorded and analysed by experts and specialists.