Fish in the Desert: A strategy that paints the future of ISIS after the collapse of its ranks

Ali Abdel Aal

Since its defeat from the cities of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, which ISIS considered as its two capitals, questions do not cease regarding the fate and future of the terrorist organization, especially after the heavy losses of lives and equipment in those countries.

How strong is the current organization after receiving a number of major strikes on its major strongholds? Is it still able to expand? Does its jihadist ideology still receive the same level of popularity? What is the fate of thousands of its fighters? What about dormant cells? These are among a number of questions aiming to identify the future of this armed organization that has occupied the world from east to west.

Four years between expansion and decline

The organization that emerged from the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq began to spread throughout the Arab region in early 2014, when it invaded the city of Fallujah and parts of the city of Ramadi, the capital of the central Iraqi Anbar province, until it took over the city of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, in June 2014. It is from Mosul’s large mosque that the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced the so-called “caliphate”, a declaration that shook not only the region but the entire world.

In Syria, the organization seized the city of Raqqa, along with a number of other cities, after the rival opposition factions were expelled in less than 60 days, having made rapid gains in the summer of 2014.

ISIS spread to more than a dozen countries in the world after many armed groups swore allegiance to ISIS. It also brought in groups of foreign fighters, mostly European and Asian youth, as well as Russians and other foreigners who adopted its ideology.

The events associated with the organization’s expansion in various regions culminated in the formation of an international coalition of more than 67 countries to combat the organization, with major countries such as the US, Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Australia taking part, as well as Iraqi and Kurdish forces.

After 1,095 days of continuous fighting, the US Government Accountability Office announced that the coalition had launched more than 23,000 raids on Iraq and Syria at a cost of $13.6 billion.

The US-led coalition, in cooperation with the Iraqi forces, launched 13,000 air strikes in Iraq and 10,000 air strikes in Syria, succeeding in restoring 75 percent of the Iraqi areas controlled by ISIS, most notably Mosul, and 58 percent of the Syrian areas controlled by ISIS, most notably Raqqa. On December 9, 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared the full control of his forces along the Syrian-Iraqi border, confirming the “end of the war” against ISIS.

Subsequent defeats

No differs as to whether the air and ground strikes directed at ISIS were severe and led to the depletion of its military, physical and human capabilities because of the superior air and military capabilities of the international coalition forces.

The results of these military strikes made the organization lose most of the land it had acquired in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, it began to lose city after city, from Tikrit in Salahuddin province, to oil-rich Sinjar and Baiji, Ramadi, Fallujah, Kabisa, Heet, Qayara, Tal Afar and Hawija. No more fighters hold any city or town in northern Iraq, leaving only pockets in some areas here and there. The organization has withdrawn from many fronts, draining it in the long run, limiting its capabilities, and destroying its main facilities for the processing and constructing bombs, and its large weapons and ammunition depots.

In Syria, attacks led by the Arab Syrian Army, with Russian support, against the organization has reduced the area controlled by ISIS to only 5 percent of the country, compared with the 33 percent it previously held.

Economically, the organization has lost a lot of its financial resources, especially oil revenues after losing many oil fields. It also lost tax revenues and its ability confiscate wealth, while its sources of international funding were also reduced in many ways. Besides the military campaign in Iraq and Syria, the international coalition had pledged to confront and disrupt the financial and economic infrastructure of the organization, thwart the influx of foreign fighters coming from across the border, and countering the propaganda of ISIS.

A transformation imposed by reality

However, the successive defeats of the organization will probably not limit its existence. According to observers, it will go through a qualitative shift, moving from a public presence to a secret existence that takes many forms, including sleeper cells and lone wolves.

Previous studies of jihadist movements and organizations have shown that the defeat of an armed organization – especially organizations of a religious or ideological nature – rarely leads to the collapse of the organization or its disappearance. Indeed, history shows that these organizations cannot be completely eliminated, especially if they have followers in other countries.

Studies conducted on show that ISIS is able to overcome losses, replace lost leaders, and return to earlier stages of work.

We are facing a functional and ideological organization that depends on security, military and advocacy structures and is managed and planned by persons who operate in a very secret and confidential manner, similar in structure and role to the intelligence services. These personalities have a history in mastering and implementing such actions in near-impossible conditions. The organization has been working for years in circumstances that are much more complicated than the current circumstances.

The organization is now behaving like a “shadow government” that manages a few thousand fighters deployed in areas of Iraq and Syria. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, remains free, and all attempts to eliminate him have failed. Meanwhile, dormant sleeper cells remain scattered in many areas and countries, especially as ISIS keeps its cells in the areas it withdraws from, asking these cells to later conduct surprise military operations.

Even though a subdued underground will diminish its ability to finance itself from its current resources, this does not mean that it will not succeed in obtaining funds. And it will still be able to carry out suicide attacks, ambushes and assassinations, even though the danger of armed attacks and bombings is not currently on the horizon.

Among the most serious subjects of concern to international observers is the fate of the 30,000 foreign fighters. The foreigners serving in ISIS were not necessarily fighters, except for the Libyans, Tunisians, some Arab elements and those coming from the Caucasus region. Most of them were in charge of the administrative branch, providing technical and research support, which shows that the branch responsible for planning attacks abroad was not significantly affected by the losses suffered by the organization.

Fish in the desert

There is another hypothesis in which the collapse of ISIS may lead to the emergence of a more violent “second generation of ISIS” in light of the political, sectarian and economic crises facing the Arab region. In light of the fragmentation of the organization and the lack of central control of its leaders, many of its elements have fled away to the desert, especially in the areas of the vast desert areas of the Euphrates River basin in Syria, the organizations last refuge where it is believed that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had resorted to hiding, which strengthens the hypothesis that it is able to reorganize itself in a new form and with a new name.

It is worth repeating here the strategy of the “Desert Fish” is mainly based on prevarication, transferring the conflict from one place to another, and implementing violent and successive attacks in new, unexpected places in order to form a new area of ​​influence.

The organization was inspired to form this strategy from the movement of the sandfish reptile, which travels from place to place by diving in the sand in order to hide from its enemies and attack its prey.

The adoption of such strategies may ensure the temporary survival of the organization by allowing it to adapt to the large number of strikes against it. Such a strategy helps it to adapt to different environments and circumstances, even for a short time, and then develop new ways to survive.

It seems that this theory has been recently adopted in the implementation of its objectives, as it withdraws from a place where it is attacked, only to come out in another place unexpected by its opponents.

With the screws being tightened on Syria and Iraq, there are indications that ISIS is directing its arrows towards new Arab states, possibly including the countries south of Syria.