Rivalry between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in Africa (Part 2)

Hamed Al Musallami

In the first part of the study, we discussed the emergence of al-Qaeda in Africa, the reasons for its emergence, and its ideological framework based on a “confrontational formula”, which holds that existing governments are illegitimate and do not rule by what God has revealed.

The second part of the study deals with the emergence of the ISIS organization, especially in Africa, and the state of rivalry and conflict between it and al-Qaeda, with a focus on the African situation, as well as the future of the two organizations in light of the current developments.

The emergence of ISIS

ISIS began as a part of the global al-Qaeda organization, through Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which was the basis of the founding of the first nucleus of the organization, which has also carried several other names, including the “Tawhid and Jihad”. The beginnings of ISIS unveil the first roots of the relationship between ISIS and al-Qaeda. Many studies indicate that the relationship between the two groups has gone through three different phases:

1 – Phase of solidarity, support and overlap (1989-2003)

During this stage, Zarqawi was part of the organization, beginning his jihadist career in the city of Peshawar, Afghanistan in 1989 with the aim of fighting against the Soviet occupation. He was saturated with the ideas of al-Qaeda. When Zarqawi returned to Jordan in 1993, he worked to establish a jihadist organization known as “Bayat al-Imam”(Allegiance to the Imam), which sought to interpret Salafi jihadist thought for the Jordanian arena.

The organization’s leaders spent several years in Jordanian jails due to the discovery of the organization’s plans, but they were released under a royal pardon in the late 1990s. Zarqawi preferred to return to Afghanistan and set up a training camp there. and because of the US reaction to the events of September 11 2001, and its war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, Zarqawi managed to organize his departure from Afghanistan through Iran to Iraq, where he created an independent global jihadist network based on support from al-Qaeda, taking Iraq as the center for a war against the US forces that were preparing to invade the country in 2003.

2 – Phase of organizational integration (2004-2010)

At this stage, the Jihad and Tawhid group led by Zarqawi, through its alliances with many Islamist organizations, managed to spread its influence over various areas of Iraq, having a significant presence among the militant Islamist organizations fighting US forces there. The organization’s authority paved the way for coordination and cooperation with al-Qaeda to attract jihadists to Iraq in order to resist US forces and their allies. As coordination between the two organizations increased, Zarqawi announced his loyalty to al-Qaeda in October 2004 and his organization became known as “al-Qaeda in Iraq”.

This phase also witnessed the beginning of the Iraqi branch’s superiority over the central branch as seen through the successes it achieved in Iraq during the period of 2003-2006, the establishment of the “Islamic State in Iraq” in 2006, and its hegemony over the Sunni areas of Iraq, as well as operations outside of Iraq, such as the Amman bombings in 2005.

Although there were some unresolved strategic differences between the two organizations regarding the priorities of the conflict, the need to fill the political vacuum in Iraq and the resistance of US forces had extinguished the outbreak of an actual crisis between them.

The two organizations’ attempts to overcome their strategic differences were somewhat contained from 2006-2010, especially after US forces succeeded in targeting and killing many of their leaders, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir in 2010, which forced them to retreat into isolation.

3 – Phase of division and competition (2011-present)

The two organizations managed to remobilize their forces in conjunction with the exit of US forces from Iraq in 2011, which ushered in a new phase characterized by competition and division. During this period, the Islamic State in Iraq organization led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was able to make a remarkable rise in the Middle East in general, and particularly in Iraq and Syria. The groups’ exploitation of the political and military weakness experienced by the Iraqi and Syrian regimes in particular contributed to the expansion of areas controlled by Baghdadi’s organization in those countries.

Under this expansion, Baghdadi announced the establishment of the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”, commonly known as ISIS or Daesh. However, Nusra Front, which followed al-Qaeda, refused to join the umbrella group of ISIS, igniting a rivalry between the two organizations over leadership of the jihadist movement in Syria. This rivalry started as an ideological and organizational schism, but soon turned into the two groups leveling accusations against each other, which has escalated at times to the point of direct military confrontation between them.

ISIS in Africa

There is no precise date for the establishment of ISIS in Africa, but with the deterioration of the security situation in the Arab and North Africa region, which accompanied what was known as the Arab Spring revolutions, the situation in Egypt, Tunisia and Mali deteriorated, especially with the fall of the Libyan regime and the total collapse of the Libyan state. Terrorist groups were active in the Sahel, Sahara and North Africa, where they began to register in the Libyan city of Sirte and then partially extended their influence to the cities of Derna and Benghazi, establishing several armed terrorist groups there pledging allegiance to ISIS, such as the Islamic Youth Shura Council and the Mujahideen of Libya, in addition to elements of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. Derna even witnessed demonstrations in support of ISIS in the spring of 2014.

With the success of ISIS in imposing influence over large areas of Iraq and the Levant, many terrorist groups began to declare their allegiance to the organization, including Boko Haram in Nigeria. This was the start of the rivalry and competition between al-Qaeda and ISIS in the African arena.

Manifestations of rivalry between ISIS and al-Qaeda

For more than a decade, al-Qaeda has been spread and rooted in communities in Somalia, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Nigeria and Algeria, and to a lesser extent in Kenya, Chad, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. It also controlled the most important smuggling routes in the region, extending from Senegal and Guinea on the Atlantic coast to the Horn of Africa on the shores of the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, ISIS exploited the period of revolutions and the collapse of some states in the Middle East and Africa to crystallize the caliphate project. It did so by reviving the idea of empowering the religion at that historic moment through the relative superiority of the Islamic groups all clustered behind its banner, as it was an organization that achieved victories and influence on the ground, making it the leader of jihadist movements worldwide.

The presence of a strong ISIS in Iraq and Syria provided an opportunity for hundreds of young followers of al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology and those dreaming of an al-Qaeda-like caliphate to declare their allegiance to ISIS and its caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and to rebel against al-Qaeda and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda considered this to be an affront and a theft of its efforts and sacrifices over the past period, causing conflict to emerge between the two terrorist organizations.

Future of the rivalry and its impact on their presence in Africa

After the relationship between the two organizations took a competitive course to establish control, the relationship has recently developed into a state of cooperation, especially after Sahel and Saharan countries started to cooperate in the fight against terrorism in the region.

Different terrorist groups aligned with either ISIS or al-Qaeda announced the formation of what they called a jihadist alliance against the joint military force that was formed of five countries in the Sahel region (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad), with the support of France and other Western countries.

Conclusion

The study showed that there are no fundamental ideological differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda, but rather only tactical and strategic differences. They have both adopted the same extremist fatwas and writings, and they believe in the need to fight those who differ with them until their dream of a caliphate is fulfilled.

The study also concluded that terrorist and radical organizations that are based on the same ideological principles but differ in tactical and strategic combat priorities, as in the case of ISIS and al-Qaeda, resort to rivalry and conflict in times of power within a weak state, where each organization attempts to obtain sole political power and effective control of the land. However, when the state or a group of states is able to confront the terrorist organizations, making it difficult for any one organization to gain victories and impose its point of view, the organizations resort to forming blocs and alliances, as happened with ISIS and al-Qaeda.

States that suffer from terrorism must take several measures in order to combat the phenomenon, the most important of which is military confrontation. Extremists also need to be defeated intellectually in debates, as well as through the use of all educational, technical and artistic means available. States also need to work on balanced economic and social development that removes injustices faced by marginalized groups. In particular, the state must resolve ethnic and racial problems, which are a major cause of insurgent movements that later turn into terrorist and radical movements. Radical terrorism is impossible to resist and root out, except by examining the deep roots of these movements.