The necessity of revenge versus the upholding of interests: Which will Iran choose in the predicament of its revenge for Soleimani?

Robert el-Fares

With the spread of wailing among the Iranian regime in grief over the liquidation of Qassem Soleimani in an American raid, the Iranian people, the peoples of the region, the Iranian resistance and most of the benevolent and peace-loving forces have breathed a sigh of relief with this good news that ended the march of a butcher stained with the blood of the Iranian people and the peoples of the region.

Opponent Mariam Rajavi said that the Iranian regime is in deep trouble over how to respond to Soleimani’s killing.

“Now is the time to strike hard the mullahs’ regime and its puppet arms in the region,” she added. The death of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the commander of the unpopular crowd in Iraq, is an irreplaceable blow to the regime of the mullahs as described.

The predicament of revenge

According to the statements of the Iranian opponent, Rajavi, the regime of the Wilayat al-Faqih from the first day had a terrorist strategy that was relied upon until the January 2018 uprising.

This strategy is based on terrorism, hostage-taking, creating crises and igniting wars to create an alleged hegemony and special situations so that no one or any force dares to approach them, show hollow power to subdue rivals and force them to blackmail.

Looking at the relations of the mullahs’ regime with European countries, some of whose citizens were always detained in order to compel them to offer political or economic privileges or at least compel them to gain their freedom in exchange for extraditing the criminals and spies of the mullahs regime imprisoned in European countries.

Terrorism and hostage-taking has been developed as a theory since Khomeini’s era as another type of force. This is why Khamenei said on Wednesday, January 1, 2020: “We will surprise everyone who threatens the interests of the regime, and we will make it a struggle.”

The reaction, the crisis and the consequences

Rajavi added that after the death of Qassem Soleimani, the mullahs’ regime is suffering from a growing crisis over whether or not to respond to this strategic strike.

There is an illusion of conflict within the fascist regime on this issue, as some of Khamenei’s clique say: “All preparations and grounds for intense revenge against terrorist America are ready, and that delay in revenge would harm what the people expect.

On the other side of the illusion, there is a larger group, as Jawad Zarif, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, says: “We will not be preoccupied with the fabricated atmosphere and the Americans will not blackmail us.”

“This means that we will not give up. They call for calm as a matter of restraint, and they plead with the international bodies and call upon them to say: Taking immediate countermeasures would necessarily lead to the outbreak of war.”

However, the restraint and global exploitation of the American terrorist act, its condemnation and its lifting in the international bodies, and responding at the same time will be the most ideal solution.

In this context, Iranian researcher Mehdi Khalaji said that, despite Iran’s great speech to lament Soleimani and despite Soleimani’s unique role in implementing Iran’s regional policy characterized by adventure and asymmetric warfare, the regime may avoid large and immediate revenge if he sees this step as too costly.

“Whatever the regime’s goals, the mourning for Soleimani’s death will not be the reaction of all Iranians to his death,” Khalaji added. Indeed, some citizens have already celebrated his death on social media.

American researcher Matthew Levitt says that the assessment of the unique intelligence that killed the Iranian Prince of Terrorism believes that Iran and its proxies will not carry out attacks inside the United States unless the latter directly targets Iran. The assassination of Soleimani would definitely fall into this category.

One case in New York City highlights the possibility that Iranian agents may carry out a terrorist retaliatory attack. In this context, Ali Kurani, a Lebanese immigrant to the United States, was convicted of leading a secret cell of the Islamic Jihad Movement, the Hezbollah wing responsible for offensive operations outside Lebanon.