Cost of Sudan’s resources: Qatari money in Bashir’s robes

Doaa Emam

Qatar’s money did not succeed in quelling the Sudanese protests that broke out at the end of 2018 to demand the overthrow of the Omar al-Bashir regime, so Doha has countered this by increasing its movements in Red Sea ports to provide possible services to save the Brotherhood in Sudan and preserve its interests.

Because of Bashir’s political inclinations and ideas that lump him with the countries supporting terrorism, the former Sudanese president agreed to an economic and military partnership with Turkey and Qatar, and the alliance between the three countries began to operate in early 2017, when Khartoum hosted a joint meeting of the defense ministers of the three countries.

In December 2017, Sudan and Turkey entered into an agreement to lease the Suakin port on the Red Sea to Ankara and for Turkish naval ships to be sent there, giving Turkey another naval base in the Red Sea in addition to the ones that it already operates in Somalia.

In March 2018, Qatar signed an agreement with Sudan worth $4 billion to develop the Suakin port, which suggests the expansion of the Qatari-Turkish alliance to the Red Sea. Then in September 2018, Turkey and Sudan also concluded a $100 million oil exploration deal.

An Asia Times report published in January 2019 pointed out that Qatar, Sudan and Turkey are governed by regimes that are sympathetic to the Brotherhood and have been harboring Brotherhood members fleeing Egypt after the June 30, 2013 revolution.

With the fall of the Bashir regime and the rise of the Sudanese Transitional Military Council to power, Khartoum’s regional policies changed, and the most important factor was the decline of Qatar’s influence, unlike in previous years when Doha was an essential pillar and an important player in Khartoum’s policies.

In this context, Bashir had visited Doha when the protests were escalating, with the aim of receiving billions of dollars of financial support in the form of cash grants that could have enabled him to overcome the crisis of street protests by launching a series of measures to reduce prices and undo the raising of fuel prices and floating the local currency, which were among the factors that caused the protests.

Tamim bin Hamad

At the outbreak of the demonstrations, Bashir received a phone call from Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad, in which the latter expressed that his country stands with Sudan and is ready to provide all that is required to help it overcome the protests, confirming his commitment to Sudan’s stability and security.

Doha was not satisfied with waving the economic file, but rather worked to restore its old interventions in the new Sudan. Qatari media intentionally intensified discussion about how the new Sudanese administration benefited from the Doha Peace Document, which raises many questions about the role Qatar is trying to play in Sudan after Bashir’s overthrow.

The countries in the region have showed a growing rejection of Qatar’s policies, with many countries distancing themselves from Doha and others boycotting it. Despite the fact that Doha has pumped billions of dollars into burning countries, it funded extremist political and religious groups to build political and economic influence, and it created groups and lobbies to implement Qatari policy within those countries.

According to Lebanese researcher Amin Qamuriya, the popular discontent in Sudan went beyond the issue of the economic crisis, so the president’s bet was lost, especially since he was counting on financial aid from Qatar and other countries without noticing that the situation in Sudan was the product of decades-old issues that required fundamental changes in the nature of the regime itself.

Qamuriya pointed out that Qatar tried to intervene to solve the crisis in Sudan to protect its interests in the Red Sea region, as well as to preserve the ideological nature of the Sudanese regime, which was in line with Qatar’s allies, the Brotherhood.