The price of Sudan’s fortunes: Qatari money in Bashir robes

Doaa Imam

The Qatari money did not succeed in quelling the Sudanese protests that erupted at the end of 2018 to demand the fall of the Omar al-Bashir regime, which Doha faced by increasing its movements in the Red Sea ports, to provide possible services to save the Brotherhood in Sudan, and to preserve its interests on the other hand.

Because of the Bashir political inclinations and ideas that unite him with the countries supporting terrorism, the former Sudanese President reached economic and military engagement with Turkey and Qatar, and the alliance between the three countries began to operate since early 2017, when Khartoum hosted a joint meeting of the defense ministers of Turkey, Qatar and Sudan.

In December 2017, Sudan and Turkey entered into an agreement to lease the Suakin port on the Red Sea to Ankara, and to run Turkish naval ships in front of it, giving Turkey another naval base in the Red Sea in addition to the ones that it already operates in Somalia.

In March 2018, Qatar signed an agreement with Sudan worth $4 billion to develop the Suakin port, which suggests the extension of the “Qatari-Turkish” alliance to the Red Sea.

In September 2018, Turkey and Sudan also concluded a $100 million oil exploration deal.

A report of the Asia Times, released in January 2019, indicated that Qatar, Sudan and Turkey are governed by sympathetic regimes of the Brotherhood, and harbor brothers escaping from Egypt after the June 30, 2013 revolution.

With the fall of the former President’s regime and the rise of the Sudanese Military Council to the site of governance, Khartoum’s regional policies changed, and the most important factor in it was the decline of Qatar’s influence, unlike in previous years, when Doha was an essential pillar and an important player in Khartoum’s policies.

In this context, he reminds the former Sudanese President Al-Bashir who visited Doha during the escalation of protest events, with the aim of receiving financial support in the form of cash grants, in the hope of obtaining billions of dollars.

That could enable him to overcome the crisis of street demonstrations, by launching a series of measures to reduce prices and undo raising fuel prices and the local currency float, which was a factor in the protesters’ protest.

Al-Bashir’s choice for Qatar came in accordance with a policy based on Doha providing support to his government, and this appeared in an official statement during the outbreak of the demonstrations, and he received a phone call from the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad, in which the latter reassured the country’s situation with the increasing intensity of the popular protests.

He expressed his country’s standing with Sudan and its readiness to provide all that is required to help it overcome this ordeal, confirming its commitment to the stability and security of Sudan.

Qatar was not satisfied with waving the economic file. Rather, its system worked to restore the interventions in the old Sudan and revive it in the new Sudan. The Doha media intentionally intensified the talk about how the new Sudan administration benefited from the “Doha Peace Document”, which raises many questions about the role it is trying to Qatar recently done in Sudan after the fall of Bashir.

The countries of the region showed a growing rejection of Qatari policy, and many countries moved away from it, and the other boycotted it gradually, despite the fact that Doha pumped billions of dollars in the burning countries, and funded extremist political and religious groups to build political and economic influence.