Erdogan’s resolution bests EU disunity, U.S. detachment

Having driven a wedge into the European Union over the ongoing Libyan civil war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to exploit the internal disunity to expand his influence or even control over the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, he seeks to expand his and Turkey’s position while the U.S. is focused on the upcoming November 3 national election.

In the proverbial story of the tortoise and the hare, the steady, resolute tortoise wins over the more energetic hare – for over two decades, Erdoğan has varied tactics without ever losing sight of the goal: the pre-eminence of Turkey in its region and among Muslim-majority nations, and of himself as leader of the Muslim world.

Lurking in the background is a bear, adept at taking advantage of the opportunities that fate, in the guise of an over-ambitious leader from the southern shores of their shared Black Sea, presents. One imagines Russian President Vladimir Putin smiling as Erdoğan undermines EU unity and NATO solidarity.

President Erdoğan has a talent for exploiting the opportunities that fate, in the form of less resolute rivals, presents to him.  In domestic politics, his failure to manipulate the re-run municipal elections of 2019 in Istanbul presents a glaring exception to his rule over Turkish electoral politics. Yet, just as rarely have he and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), gained a majority of votes cast. The peculiarities of the Turkish electoral system, and his clever exploitation of his rivals’ disunity, have yielded him firm control of Parliament over almost two decades, even if more votes were cast against the AKP than for it. So too in foreign affairs.

This advantage of Turkey’s resolution in comparison to EU disunity in its support for Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean is playing out before our eyes. On this base of disunified opposition, Erdoğan builds a structure of domestic resentment of Greek sovereignty over islands close to the Anatolian mainland.  Erdoğan seeks to extend Turkish de facto sovereignty over a vast maritime region likely rich in hydrocarbons and other natural resources to which many other nations have as strong or even a better claim.  But do not be deceived – Erdoğan’s goal far exceeds developing a strong negotiating position over the division of the natural resources of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Erdoğan likes to portray himself as the defender of Muslim interests, privileges, and rights – wherever they might be.  Whether railing against alleged Islamophobia in Europe, denouncing the state of Israel for real or imagined slights against Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, or converting museums into mosques to reverse Ataturk’s secularist reforms, Erdoğan carefully cultivates his image as the leading defender of all Muslims, especially those in Turkey’s “Near Abroad”. For the moment, he says little about the oppressed Muslim Uygurs of western China, seeing no tactical or practical advantage in doing so.

He leverages this self-portrayal against his domestic political opponents and against international opponents of his expansionist efforts. At home, he smears his opponents as not truly Muslim, abroad, he labels opponents as anti-Turk or anti-Muslim. In both cases, he effectively neutralises opponents, many of them desperate to avoid the labels he attempts to stick on them.

The EU, in particular, led by bureaucrats and elected leaders disdainful and therefore uncomprehending of religious identity and its political potency, has bent over backwards to avoid the impression it might be intolerant of Islam. Repeatedly it has failed to see Islam as a mosaic, rather than a monolith aligned with a particular brand of Islam – in this case, the Tayyip Erdoğan brand.  This is a great irony, as in acquiescing to Erdoğan’s form of Islam, many EU politicians reveal their ignorance of Islam.

At the same time, though U.S. President Donald Trump could actually play a mediating role between Greece/EU and Turkey, he only pays the minimum amount of attention to the simmering dispute.  Being on relatively better terms with Erdoğan than the EU leadership, Trump could allay any Turkish fears that he would favor the EU side. But Trump is increasingly concerned with winning re-election on November 3, making time for little else in his agenda. Erdoğan knows this, and therefore is confident that he can push against Greece because the only significant Western leader with whom he remains on good terms will not press him to relent – at least not until after the U.S. elections.

For all this, the situation is unlikely to be resolved unless and until Erdoğan decides he has asserted Turkish rights and privileges enough to not lose anything by stepping back for a short pause in his efforts to attain his goal.  But will Erdoğan be satisfied with pre-eminence in the Eastern Mediterranean, or will he push for more?

The growing fear in EU capitals and the corridors of NATO headquarters in Brussels, much more so than in the plush offices of the Presidential Palace in Ankara, is that things will spin out of hand, ships will collide (again), and lives may be lost. If this last possibility were to occur, post facto efforts at resolution of the conflict and reconciliation would be almost impossible.

Meanwhile, the Russian bear surveys the grounds, wondering if turtle soup goes well with roast rabbit.