After Hamas cheered Taliban: Palestinian forces refuse to relate independence to Afghan experience

Doaa Emam

Since the Taliban extended its grip on Afghanistan during the US and NATO withdrawal, a state of anticipation has prevailed within political Islamist parties and groups in the region. Although the pro-Brotherhood entities were quick to congratulate and cheer, Hamas had a different reaction, as it promoted that the Afghan scenario is the most appropriate for resolving the Palestinian issue.

Hamas-Taliban

In a phone call between Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, head of the Taliban’s political bureau, the first said, “The evacuation of America from Afghan soil is a prelude to the demise of all forces of oppression, foremost of which is the Israeli occupation of the land of Palestine.”

In response to Hamas’s attempts to the polishing and propaganda attempts made by Hamas in favor of the Taliban, the Secretary-General of the Palestinian People’s Party, Bassam al-Salhi, refused to portray the Afghan model as the solution to what Palestine is going through, calling on Hamas and its leaders to refrain from glorifying the Afghan extremist movement and its ilk, and not to link the Palestinian cause to a terrorist movement like it. He pointed to the importance of distinguishing between the Taliban and the Palestinian national liberation movements that attract the support of people all over the world.

Meanwhile, Suhail Shaheen, a spokesman for the Taliban, denied any cooperation with Hamas, adding, “If Hamas congratulates us on freedom and the end of the occupation, there is nothing wrong, but we have no cooperation with Hamas in any area.”

More conservative approach

Hebrew media reported that with the Taliban’s seizure of power, it would allow the transfer of Afghan army bases and training facilities to various organizations and groups, as well as the possibility of smuggling weapons and ammunition, largely from Afghanistan to the Gaza Strip.

In a study entitled “A more conservative approach: How to understand the discourse and practices of the Taliban movement”, Dr. Ammar Ali Hassan addressed the agreement of some Islamist currents with the goals set by the Taliban, indicating that in the end they remain just general goals. But when looking at the methods and means of achieving these goals, it becomes clear that the Afghan movement does not differ from others in acting on the basis of a belief that it represents the “true Islam” and that others do not, as is the case of the political Islamist factions.

On this basis, the Taliban fought many Islamist factions in the period from 1994 until it was able to enter Kabul and declare an Islamic emirate in 1996.

Hassan pointed out that the support of some Islamist political organizations and groups, including Hamas, for the victory that the Taliban recently achieved in Afghanistan after 20 years does not mean its identification with the Taliban project, nor its relinquishment to it, its acquiescence to it, or its satisfaction with it. The Taliban still represents, in relation to other political Islamist groups, especially the Salafist-jihadist groups, as a disparate and even innovator group.

The study concluded that the political Islamist groups saw what the Americans did as an eloquent message to anti-Islamist regimes that have alliances or friendship with the United States or were protected by it, as well as to elites that these groups describe as Western puppets, similar to the Afghan elites that Washington did not protect in the end. Most important of all, these groups found what the Taliban did inspiring, with the possibility of gaining power by taking up arms.