Reasons and mechanisms of Russian rapprochement with Taliban

Mahmoud al-Batakoushi

Politics does not know the impossible, as there is no permanent enemy and no permanent friend, and interests rule everything. Although Russia has banned the Taliban and considered it a terrorist group since 2003, Moscow has issued more than one statement recently after the movement took control of power in Afghanistan, in which it confirmed its readiness to cooperate with the new regime, according to the statements of Zamir Kabulov, the Russian President’s special envoy to Afghanistan, regarding Moscow’s optimism about relations between Russia and Afghanistan after the change of power in the country, stressing that he will talk with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, head of the Taliban’s political bureau.

Kabulov stressed that Russia maintains good relations with the former Afghan government that left the country and the Taliban alike, so Moscow is not worried, as Russian President Vladimir Putin announced during his meeting with representatives of the ruling United Russia party, that the situation in Afghanistan is directly related to Russia’s security.

“We do not want the Afghan militants to come under the cover of refugees,” he said, which reflects the desire of the Russian regime to cooperate with the Taliban so as not to bear the bill for the possible chaos in Afghanistan, which will definitely affect the Central Asian region and may extend to the North Caucasus and harm Russia’s national interests.

No one forgets that the presence of the international coalition forces in Afghanistan allowed the deployment of Western bases in the Central Asian region, including a French base in Tajikistan, a German Termez base in Uzbekistan, the US Karshi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan and the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan, which worried Russia about the expansion of NATO on its western borders and encircling it on all sides.

The presence of ISIS in Afghanistan since 2017 has played a magic effect in the improvement of the relationship between Russia and the Taliban, as Moscow feared that the terrorist organization’s fighters would gather and that Afghanistan would turn into a new center for fighters who would attack its allies and revive the insurgency in the North Caucasus due to the weakness of the Kabul government.

This was evident when Moscow received the Taliban delegation consisting of five of its leaders in the context of its quest to hold a peace conference to start negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban on November 9, 2018, after which meetings followed in 2019, 2020 and this year. The meetings resulted in many understandings on several matters between the two sides, as evidenced by the fact that the Russian embassy in Kabul was not closed, and the Taliban affirmed that it would not allow any person or entity to use the territory of Afghanistan to attack Russia or neighboring countries or smuggle drugs to Russia, and that the Russian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, under the protection of the movement, will not be allowed to be attacked.

Russia desires rapprochement with the Taliban because of its close proximity to its borders, as only 4,053 km separates them, and Moscow wants Afghanistan to become stable so that it does not turn into a claw that threatens its national security. Therefore, the deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council’s Defense and Security Committee, Vladimir Dzhabarov, stressed that the Russian government must communicate with the Taliban and that it “will deal with any future Afghan government, even if it is led by the Taliban, as long as the latter is committed to not jeopardizing Russian interests.” He also raised the possibility of reconsidering the movement’s designation as a terrorist organization banned in Russia, as long as it does not threaten Russian interests.

Moscow considers it necessary to coordinate with the Taliban in order to get rid of the danger of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the jihadist movements in the North Caucasus and Central Asian region, and prevent Afghanistan from turning into a gathering point for these movements, as this would increase the security burden on Russia and weaken its foreign political capabilities.

The Taliban’s control of Afghanistan also poses a major threat to Russia, as it may allow the presence of anti-Russian groups in Asia Minor, such as the Brotherhood in Tajikistan. There are also jihadist movements with ethnic extensions in Afghanistan that could possibly get involvement in conflict, such as the extremist jihadist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has a popular ethnic and ideological incubator among the Uzbeks in Afghanistan and in 2015 pledged allegiance to the Taliban, before turning against it and pledging allegiance to ISIS. Other terrorist organizations include the Islamist Ikramiya organization, Jund al-Khilafah, and the Islamic-nationalist Alash Party in Kazakhstan, which is hostile to Russia and its culture and calls for the expulsion of Russians from Kazakhstan.

On the other hand, the Taliban seeks international recognition by holding negotiations with Moscow, which is well aware of the importance of Afghanistan for Russia’s security and geopolitical strategy, and that it is closer to it than any other party. Therefore, the movement was keen to provide reassurances to Russia to dispel its fears.