Motives for Washington targeting al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen

Nora Bandari

The US administration has focused in recent months on curtailing the activity of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) through two means, either setting financial rewards for obtaining information about the organization’s leaders or launching airstrikes targeting its most prominent leaders.

Through these measures, Washington is trying to cause a crisis within the terrorist organization by killing its leaders, after which it will take time for the organization to rearrange its ranks.

Targeting al-Qaeda leaders

The latest operation launched by Washington against AQAP was on January 31, during which Hassan al-Hadrami, the most prominent explosives expert in the organization, and his brother were killed in an airstrike by drones in the oil governorate of Marib, northeastern Yemen.

Late last year, the US Air Force launched a series of strikes on al-Qaeda leadership positions, specifically in the southern Yemeni governorates of Shabwah, Abyan, Hadhramaut, and Marib, the last of which was on November 29, 2022, when a drone strike targeted some strongholds where AQAP leaders were hiding in the city of Marib.

In mid-December 2022, the US Treasury announced a financial reward of $5 million for anyone who provides information about AQAP leader Abu Ayman al-Masri. His death has always been reported, but Washington denies this and announces from time to time a financial reward for anyone who provides any information about him.

Continuous targeting

Hesham El-Naggar, a researcher in political Islam, said that the targeting of al-Qaeda leaders is part of a program to track and prosecute the leaders of the transnational terrorist organization, but underestimates the value of the effort that al-Qaeda is not alone in the scene, where it maneuvers and absorbs blows through indirect and secret relations and coordination with the Houthis, as well as the Yemeni Brotherhood.

Naggar pointed out in a special statement to the Reference that Washington is aware that any stability, expansion and gain achieved by the Houthis in Yemen benefits al-Qaeda, which may raise false slogans that apply the exact opposite on the ground, because its field movements and withdrawals from some areas have been clearly coordinated with the Houthis to achieve mutual gains and interests. This means that any complacency and turning a blind eye to the practices, gains, and influence of the Houthis is indirectly in the interest of al-Qaeda, which plays with the available cards on the ground and benefits from the powerful forces that control large areas in the Yemeni arena.

Naggar added that the policy of targeting al-Qaeda leaders, even if it succeeds in some arenas, is not sufficient in the Yemeni arena, which needs comprehensive and more complex solutions on the ground, including reducing the influence of the Houthis to a minimum and working to establish a just and urgent political settlement.