Somali Ports between UAE’s development and Qatar’s greed

By Moustafa Khamal

Somalia has the largest coastline in Africa, locating on the Red Sea and Pacific Ocean. It is estimated about 3,000 km in length. However, the economic and humanitarian situations along the coastline have been wrapped in misery due to political vacuum, garbage, poaching, and piracy that threatens the international maritime navigation.

Somalia has four main ports not subject to the Federal government administration.

1- Mogadishu Port:

It is the largest and the most famous port in the country. The port stopped operation after the downfall of the central government in 1991 and re-operated during the presence of the UN peacekeeping forces. However, It shut down again after the withdrawal of the peacekeepers. When the Islamic Court Unions controlled over the country in 2006, the port re-opened and was managed by Turkish company of Al-Bayrak. i

2- Berbera port:

It is located in Somaliland, which announced its independence in 1991. The port, which was established in 1968, is one of the most important strategic locations as it can control any air or naval military exercise in Yemen. Through Berbera port, Livestock is being exported to the Middle East and Gulf States, and fuel is being imported to Somalia.

Somali government has previously asked to use Egyptian and Saudi ports to exports its livestock as breakaway Somaliland is not internationally recognized.[i]

3- Bosaso Port:

The port is located eastern Somalia. It was established in 1980s as a result of a Italy-brokered deal conducted by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and Said Berri’s regime. The port falls under the administration of the autonomous city of Puntland, and recently has economically revived under this administration.[ii]

4- Kismayo Port:

The 52-year-old port is located on the Pacific Ocean near agricultural cities and falls under the administration of autonomous region of Jubaland. It has been used for exporting the Somali local productions of fruits and for importing agricultural equipment. The port suffers deterioration as 80 percent of works shut down due to the lack of maintenance.[iii]

UAE role in development of Somali ports

The UAE’s development strategy is based on several basic dimensions, humanitarianly, securely, and economically.

First, the UAE has adopted a strategy to improve the efficiency of the Somali ports via using its experience of reforming and restoration, and via offering employment opportunities among the Somali people to protect them from joining the armed groups.

The Gulf State has signed a number of agreements with the Somali government to expand and develop all ports. In 2013, one of such agreements was inked with Puntland[iv]. In 2017, DP World obtained the concession to manage and develop Berbera port for 30 years at a cost of $442 million in investment; as per the contract, DP World will improve the port infrastructure, especially the road connecting the city of Berbera with the Ethiopian border to facilitate goods shipment.

Second, the UAE strengthened security and intelligence relations with the Somali government by providing joint training programs with the Somalia’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the National Intelligence and Security Service in 2015.  Also, the Armed Forces of the UAE trained several units of the Somali Armed Forces. The oil-rich country has also supplied Jubaland administration with a number of mine-resistant vehicles, RG-31 armored personnel carriers, Reva Mk. III armored vehicles, water carrier trucks, police motorcycles for the Department of Homeland Security and the police.[v]

Third, The UAE has backed Somali government in the international disputes. The UAE paid the defense fees of the Somali party in the international dispute over the coast of Kismayo, which borders of Kenya.[vi]

Qatar’s sabotage role in Somali Ports

Qatar is extending its influence in the Middle East via empowering extremists and terrorists, and adopting Iran’s policies in the region, particularly Somalia. Doha was using its investments in Eretria to send money to Al-Shabab militant group in Somalia. Qatar also was accused of inciting members of the Islamic Courts in Berbera to stage protests against the UAE’s contract to develop the port.

A day after a new agreement was signed among the DP World, the Somaliland and Ethiopia to improve Berbera port, Qatar issued a statement calling for terminating the agreement.[vii]

Doha also was accused of financial supporting to Somali militants along the borders with Ethiopia.

In conclusion, the deteriorating situation of Somali ports could make Qatar to wield more influence through the extremists to threaten the Arab and Gulf security. Arab countries, especially the neighbors of the Horn of Africa, have to formulate a clear foreign policy to secure its common interests towards the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, Arab assistance should not limit to only humanitarian and financial aid.

Arabs should take a vivid strategy to protect the regional national security,  amid the efforts of Qatar and Iran to extend their influence towards Yemen, and amid of Israel’s strengthening relations with the East African countries in general and the Horn of Africa.

[i] Berbera port development deal signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland – Al-Sharq Awsat https://aawsat.com/home/article/1191106/%25C2%25AB%25D9%2585%25D9%2588%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586%25D8%25A6-%25D8%25AF%25D8%25A8%25D9%258A%25C2%25BB-%25D8%25AA%25D9%2588%25D9%2582%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%2581%25D8%25A7%25D9%2582%25D8%25A7%25D9%258B-%25D9%2585%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25A5%25D8%25AB%25D9%258A%25D9%2588%25D8%25A8%25D9%258A%25D8%25A7-%25D9%2588%25D8%25A3%25D8%25B1%25D8%25B6-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584-%25D9%2584%25D8%25AA%25D8%25B7%25D9%2588%25D9%258A%25D8%25B1-%25C2%25AB%25D9%2585%25D9%258A%25D9%2586%25D8%25A7%25D8%25A1-%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A9%25C2%25BB

[ii] Somali Today (http://somaliatoday.net/%25D8%25AA%25D9%2588%25D9%2582%25D9%258A%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%2581%25D8%25A7%25D9%2582-%25D9%2585%25D9%258A%25D9%2586%25D8%25A7%25D8%25A1-%25D8%25A8%25D9%2588%25D8%25B5%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588-%25D9%2585%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25B4%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A5%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7/)

[iii] Mogadishu Center for Research and Study (http://mogadishucenter.com/2015/09/%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7-%25D8%25B0%25D8%25A7-%25D8%25AA%25D8%25B9%25D8%25B1%25D9%2581-%25D8%25B9%25D9%2586-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25A3%25D9%2587%25D9%2585%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B3%25D8%25AA%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%258A%25D8%25AC%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D9%2584%25D9%2585%25D9%258A/)

[iv] Somali Times (http://www.somalitimes.net/2017/04/07/%25D8%25B4%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A5%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25AA%25D9%2588%25D9%2582%25D8%25B9-%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA%25D9%2581%25D8%25A7%25D9%2582%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D9%2585%25D8%25B9-%25D9%2588%25D9%2584%25D8%25A7%25D9%258A%25D8%25A9-%25D8%25A8%25D9%2588/)

[v] UAE eyes west of Suez by Washington Institution (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates

[vi] Mogadishu Center for Research and Study (http://mogadishucenter.com/2017/08/%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25A5%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AA-%25D9%2588%25D8%25AA%25D8%25B1%25D9%2583%25D9%258A%25D8%25A7-%25D8%25AA%25D8%25AA%25D9%2586%25D8%25A7%25D9%2581%25D8%25B3%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586-%25D9%2581%25D9%258A-%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584/)

[vii] Al-Sharq (https://www.al-sharq.com/article/03/03/2018/%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B5%25D9%2588%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584-%25D8%25AA%25D9%2586%25D9%2587%25D9%258A-%25D8%25B3%25D9%258A%25D8%25B7%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A9-%25D9%2585%25D9%2588%25D8%25A7%25D9%2586%25D8%25A6-%25D8%25AF%25D8%25A8%25D9%258A-%25D8%25B9%25D9%2584%25D9%2589-%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A8%25D8%25B1%25D8%25A9)