Rehabilitation of extremists: Previous success story and future vision for community reintegration

State strategy to turn terrorists into model individuals

Ahmed Kamel El-Beheiry

The Egyptian state is facing a number of complicated challenges. How to deal with extremists and terrorists, who have been detained or have returned from conflict areas, is one of three major challenges facing the state.

The 1^st challenge

The detained extremists may recruit many young people in jail.  They may recruit criminals behind bars. Imprisoned Al-Qaeda and Daesh elements may also recruit young people of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The 2^nd challenge

The detained terrorists may also have communication channels with other takfiri organizations abroad as happened in an attempt to assassinate former president Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The investigations revealed that some leaders of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya, imprisoned in Egypt, arranged the assassination attempt in coordination with some elements abroad.

The 3^rd challenge

These elements stand out as what might be labeled as a “time bomb”, or a potential hazard. In case of any security turmoil, these elements may emerge as a seed for more dangerous groups as happened in Syria, Libya and Iraq.

Parallel conception

These three challenges drive us to suggest a parallel conception along with toughening punitive measures. This conception is based on two paths: enhancing the security and information efficiency to face the takfiris, and adopting a new strategy for rehabilitation, especially for those returning from conflict areas for community reintegration in a bid to rein in their potential dangers in the future.

However, these rehabilitation attempts require significant development to be effective and influential. For a rehabilitation and reintegration strategy, the methods used by takfiris to recruit the youth should be well identified. The terrorist organizations draw on five methods to recruit the youth.

These recruitment methods are: injustice, the dream to realize the Islamic caliphate, revenge, fear and poverty.

Egyptian experiences

The Egyptian state has gone through violent clashes with terrorists over the last two decades of the 20^th century. The local takfiri organizations were Al- Jama’a Al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad. Consequently, there was an organizational unity between Al-Jihad and Afghani-based Al-Qaeda.

A number of deadly terrorist attacks took place from Assiut Security Directorate operation, in which 118 conscripts and police officers were killed in 1981 to Luxor operation, in which 58 tourists were killed in 1997.

The Luxor operation marked a strategic turning point of the security perspective, resulting in what was labeled in the media as “intellectual revisions of Al- Jama’a Al-Islamiyya.

The revisions were under the supervision of major general Ahmed Raafat, former deputy head of the State Security Investigation Department. Here we analyze the revisions, which marked a turning point in the past, to see if it could be used as a mechanism for dealing with other takfiri organizations.

Non-violence initiative

Al- Jama’a Al-Islamiyya launched non-violence initiative in July 1997 in a statement by Mohamed Abdel Alim, one of the organization’s second-tier leaders. However, it was not taken seriously as many experts and authorities doubted it and considered it a sort of evasion.

Doubts intensified after the Luxor deadly attack took place on November 17, 1997.

A mediator

Ahmed Raafat, who used Haj Moustafa Refaat as a pseudonym, drew on the non-violence initiative to open communication channels with the leaders of Al- Jama’a Al-Islamiyya after he had persuaded the authorities of reintegration and rehabilitation.

Raafat worked on that path for nearly five years until the revisions saw the light in February 2002 in four books, authored by a numbr of the organization’s leaders such as Karam Zohdi, Nageh Ibrahim, Essam Derbala, Assem Abdel Maged, Osama Hafez, Fouad El-Dawaliby and Hamdy Abdel Rahman.

Steps for success

The rehabilitation and reintegration initiative went through five phases to bear fruit as follows:

1. Confidence building: This is the most important phase as it is the starting point for successful talks, especially with militant organizations. Nageh Ibrahim described major general Ahmed Raafat as an excellent man behind the revisions.
2. State persuasion: Raafat relied on door-knocking to persuade the authorities.
3. Negotiation tactics: Raafat and leaders of Al- Jama’a Al-Islamiyya worked on two levels. Al- Jama’a Al-Islamiyya leaders, security officials and experts on Islamic Shariah and jurisprudence. The second level each leader of Al- Jama’a Al-Islamiyya went to talk to other members in prison to persuade them of the revisions.
4. State positive move: The state took a number of moves towards the organization’s members in prison. It released many of them and printed the revisions.
5. Community reintegration: This is the most essential phase, which is the key turning point in rehabilitation, ensuring that takfiris wouldn’t return to violence. The state worked on the economic, social and financial well-being of the rehabilitated members. For instance, it opened a clinic for Nageh Ibrahim. It employed many of the rehabilitated members in private companies and public authorities.

Could that be repeated? If yes, with whom?

The non-violence initiative may be repeated with takfiris returning from abroad like Daesh for instance, especially with those who are desperate and inactive members.  However, the problematic issue emerges when it comes to implanting this approach in dealing with takfiri groups, which are active in Egypt.

Most of these groups have emerged under the auspices of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Hasm, Lewaa Al-Thawra (The Revolution Brigade) and others. Therefore, an approach based on revisions will be difficult for two reasons: the jurisprudent structure of the Muslim Brotherhood is of secondary importance compared to common interests the organization’s members, and “the living approach” adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood’s members from family up to the organization’s hierarchy.

Therefore, dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood’s organization would require a new approach based on creating a parallel network of interests attracting the organization’s members, on one hand, and introducing a different living approach  for the detainees on the other hand.

Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood detainees should be separated and located together to create a new living style for them.

The so-called Muslim Brotherhood revisions, which emerged in 2017 and early 2018, have been inaccurate for two reasons: the media cited individual cases that cannot be sort of rehabilitation and reintegration, and there’s confusion between reconciliation and the concept of rehabilitation and reintegration.

Conclusion

The Egyptian state introduced in the beginning of the millennium a model of rehabilitation and community reintegration for many of takfiris starting by members of Al- Jama’a Al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad, in addition to others returning from Chechnya and Albania.

The initiative may be a key approach to set up a new strategy  for the rehabilitation and reintegration of takfiris, especially those returning from Syria and Iraq.