Developments and future of the dispute between forces of political Islam and the regime in Algeria

 

Abul Fadl Al-Isnawi

Relations between the Algerian political system and forces of political Islam during Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s administration took a different route than former regimes.

Since Bouteflika’s first term, and until his third, which witnessed revolutions of the Arab Spring, relations with political Islam were considered strong and active.

After 2011, these powers, which seen Bouteflika’s consecutive governments, separated from the regime.

But before answering the main question of this study, which revolves around the future of relations and the crisis between the Algerian regime and political Islam, we must refer to the cohesion between forces of political Islam in Algeria, which got stronger after May 2017.

The return of Islamic movements HAMAS and Al-Nahda to forces of political Islam in Algeria might widen the gap that currently faces the crisis, especially after these forces refused to participate in Abdelmalek Sellal’s government, which followed the legislative election in May 2017, and refused Bouteflika’s call to rejoin the presidential alliance.

This study will try to explain the relation between forces of political Islam and the regime in Algeria; it will also shed the light on the reasons behind the deterioration in the relations between forces of political Islam and the Algerian regime, and to what extent will the dispute reach?

The study is divided into three pillars; the first pillar focuses on the map of political Islam in Algeria and its developments after 2011; the second pillar sheds the light on dimensions of the crisis between Islamist forces and the authority; while the third pillar addresses the future of the crisis and potential scenarios between the two sides.

 

The first pillar – Map of political Islam in Algeria:

In order to define the change in the relation between the regime and forces of political Islam since 2011, this study focuses on the new map of forces of political Islam in Algeria. This map is deemed one of the reasons behind the dissociations between the regime and the peaceful movements that existed during Bouteflika’s administration and until revolutions of the Arab Spring in 2011.

 

• Old political Islam forces:

Islamist parties emerged in Algeria after the establishment of a multiparty system during former president Chadli Bendjedid’s presidency, they relied on dialogue to reach the authority; the most important of these parties are:

 

• Movement of Society for Peace (HAMAS):

HAMAS is considered one of the largest Islamist powers in Algeria, it was formed in 1991. Its first legal framework was under the banner of the Association for Guidance and Reform, which was formed in Nov. 1988, after the group started operating in public in the mid-70s with clear opposition against Houari Boumédiène’s regime. This was under the leadership of Mahfoud Nahnah, who called for “Islamic reform work” and avoiding clash with the authority and rely on negotiation instead, in addition to cooperation with all Islamist forces[1]. HAMAS used to operate in secret since 1963, following the international ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.

 

• The Islamic Renaissance Movement (Al-Nahda):

Established in 1988 by Abdallah Djaballah, the movement followed the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach, until the mid-80s; as Djaballah introduced a new term to the movement’s literature, namely “the local brotherhood”, instead of “the international brotherhood”. Then in 1990, the movement managed to establish a party and get seats at the parliament during the 1997 parliamentary election, which made the party change its name to become “Al-Nahda Movement”[2] (Renaissance Movement) in accordance with the political parties act that was issued on June 6, 1997.

 

• New political Islam forces:

As HAMAS and Al-Nahda experienced defections, six Islamist parties were founded after Bouteflika’s constitutional amendments in April 2011. Three of the Islamist parties were founded in 2011, namely “The Freedom and Justice Party”, headed by moderate Islamist Mohamed Al-Saeed, “The Front for Change”, headed by Abdelmadjid Menasra, and “The Front of Justice and Development”, which emerged from Al-Nahda and The Reform, which were founded by Abdallah Djaballah.

The Algerian Ministry of Interior also allowed the new parties to function, along with two other parties that were founded in 2013, namely “Algeria Hope”, headed by Amar Ghoul, and “National Building Movement”, under the leadership of Mustapha Belmehdi[3].

 

The second pillar – The relation between Islamists and the authority in Algeria before 2012:

The relation between forces of political Islam and the authority, since the beginning of Bouteflika’s presidency and until the beginning of 2012, was based on cooperation; this could be clarified as follows:

 

Cooperation with the authority:

During Bouteflika’s presidency, HAMAS and Al-Nahda took part at consecutive governments, elections, policies and goals that were set without real opposition, especially HAMAS; these parties only claimed financial and personal gains for its leaders, deputies and ministers[4]. As for limits of the strategic partnership between these parties and the regime, they can be identified through taking a close look through the electoral process and its results, as follows:

 

• Presidential elections:

The study will focus on two elections, which are the elections of Apr. 8, 2004, and Apr. 9, 2009.

 

• April 2004 Elections:

These elections represent the beginning of the advancement of the party coalition, which HAMAS and Al-Nahda were part of, to a presidential alliance on the basis of a charter that was signed on Apr. 16, 2004, a few days ahead of elections. The charter included principles, work mechanisms, and goals. It consisted of The National Liberation Front, HAMAS, the National Rally for Democracy, and Al-Nahda, which remotely supported the alliance. This allowed the party coalition to upgrade into a presidential alliance, to name a presidential candidate.

Bouteflika’s superiority over presidential candidate Abdallah Djaballah, as demonstrated in “Table (2)”, shows a partisan commitment by HAMAS and Al-Nahda that backed Bouteflika in cooperation with the parties in power, for their common good.

 

Table (2) – Results of the 2004 presidential elections in Algeria[5]
Candidates	Votes	Percentage (%)
Abdelaziz Bouteflika	8,651,723	84.99%
Ali Benflis	653,951	6.42%
Abdallah Djaballah	511,526	5.02%
Saïd Sadi	197,111	1.94%
Louisa Hanoune	101,630	1.0%
Ali Fawzi Rebaine	63,761	0.6%

 

Based on the former table, we can conclude the following notes about forces of political Islam:

• The success the Bouteflika made during his first presidential term in fields of civil peace, security and reconciliation, with the continuation of the presidential alliance, made him 84,99% ahead of his opponents; especially Djaballah who represented Islamist opposition only took 5.02% of the votes.
• Results of the 2004 elections shows that the new head of the movement, Bouguerra Soltani, followed the same policy of the movement’s former leader Mahfoud Nahnah who died in June 19, 2003.

 

• 2009 Elections:

Before the elections in 2009 started, HAMAS, Al-Nahda and the Movement for National Reform agreed to the constitutional amendments in Nov. 12, 2008, especially article no. 74 that paved the way for Bouteflika to run for a new presidential term. As Islamist parties and movements were weak and full of divisions, forces of political Islam sought to remain as close to the regime as possible.

Table no. 3 shows how Bouteflika remained at the top of the scene, which was empty of Islamist candidate, as Islamist parties kept supporting Bouteflika.

 

Table (3) – Results of the 2009 presidential elections in Algeria
Candidates	Votes	Percentage (%)
Abdelaziz Bouteflika	12,911,705	90.24%
Louisa Hanoune	604,258	4.22%
Moussa Touati	330,570	2.31%
Djahid Younsi	176,674	1.37%
Ali Fawzi Rebaine	133,129	0.93%
Mohammed Said	132,242	0.92%

 

By reading this table we can notice the following notes about the performance and stands of Islamist parties towards the authority:

• Bouteflika manages to surpass despite the weakness of Islamist parties during these elections. HAMAS’ head Bouguerra Soltani affirmed, as he considered the alliance during that time to be a political mechanism that ensured a stable atmosphere and put an end to grandstands and bargains, which was in everybody’s interest.
• The internal divisions that hit Islamist movements did not affect the voting process that went in Bouteflika’s favor, achieving even more success compared to the 2004’s elections. As Islamist parties reached their weakest at that time, they considered withdrawing from the alliance with the authority, even the Movement of Society for Peace announced back then that “the movement’s commitment to the alliance is an option,” and confirmed the independency of political decisions of all parties.

 

• Parliamentary elections:

The connection between Islamist forces and the authority in Algeria can be measured by observing and analyzing the legislative elections that preceded revolutions of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the change of heart against Bouteflika and his regime. Here we shed the light on the elections of May 2002 and 2007 as follows:

 

• The legislative elections in May 30, 2002:

This was Bouteflika’s first parliamentary election since he assumed office. And we can deduct the following results by taking a look at the following table:

 

Table (4)[6] – Results of the 2002 legislative elections in Algeria
Parties	Votes	Percentage (%)	Seats
National Liberation Front	2.618.003	34.3%	199
Movement for National Reform	705.319	9.5%	43
National Rally for Democracy	610.461	8.2%	47
Movement for the Society of Peace	523.464	7.0%	38
Workers’ Party	245.770	3.3%	21
Algerian National Front	113.700	1.6%	8
Islamic Renaissance Movement	48.132	0.6%	1
Party of Algerian Renewal	19.873	0.3%	1
Movement of National Understanding	14.465	0.2%	1

 

Based on table no. 4, the following notes emerge about the participation of forces of political Islam during these elections:

 

• The total seats of Islamist parties reached 82 seats, compared to 102 seats during the previous elections, as HAMAS only got 38 seats, compared to 69 seats, thanks to its fickle stands, deputies and ministers, and how most of them only sought personal interests out of allying with the authority.
• As Islamist parties realized that they cannot take their share of authority, so instead, they got closer to the authority for some privileges instead of toppling the regime.

These parties also supported the government within the parliament during the legislative period between 2002 and 2007, as they approved the majority of Bouteflika’s draft laws[7].

 

• The legislative elections in May 17, 2007:

The presidential alliance that was consisted of HAMAS, the Liberation Front, and the National Rally kept on representing forces of political Islam until the latest legislative election that preceded the 2011 revolution; the following table shows results of the 2007 legislative elections in Algeria.

 

Table (5)[8] – Results of the 2007 legislative elections in Algeria
Parties	Percentage (%)	Seats
National Liberation Front	22.98%	136
National Rally for Democracy	10.44%	61
Movement for the Society of Peace	9.64%	52
Independents	9.85%	33
Workers’ Party	5.09%	26
Rally for Culture and Democracy	4.18%	19
Algerian National Front	3.36%	13
Islamic Renaissance Movement (Al-Nahda)	1.5%	5
Movement for National Reform	1%	3
El-Infitah Movement	1%	3

 

• The previous table shows a significant recession in the popularity of Islamist movement in Algeria during that period due to its international crises and merging with the regime; The Movement for National Reform only received three seats, while Al-Nahda only received five seats, the matter that provoked the movement into boycotting the upcoming presidential election.
• Representatives of the three Islamist parties kept on supporting government draft projects, they also approved Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem’s program in July 23, 2007. Moreover, Islamist parties in the parliament approved the constitutional amendment in Nov. 2008, which allowed Bouteflika a third presidential term.

 

• Successive governments:

Bouteflika’s government and leaders of Islamists movements were keen on the continuation of the presidential alliance as it used to serve everybody’s interests. Parties of the alliance knew the necessity of preserving the alliance and providing consent among its members, because this alliance was upgraded from being a coalition into a presidential alliance, which includes all the strategies of the authority and the parties within the alliance[9].

And to affirm the alliance between the peaceful Islamic movement and Bouteflika’s regime, we can take a look at the formation of governments since Bouteflika assumed office and until May 2012. We may notice that the Movement for the Society of Peace, with three ministers, and Al-Nahda, with two ministers, were partners within the government coalition of Bouteflika’s first and second governments. However, after Al-Nahda got hit by internal divisions and was divided into two fronts that remotely supported the regime during elections, and as the government coalition merged into the presidential alliance, the cabinet reshuffle was limited to the alliance, which included the National Liberation Front, the National Rally for Democracy, and HAMAS.

 

The third pillar – The reality and developments of the crisis between forces of political Islam and the authority:

After 2011, ties between HAMAS, Al-Nahda, and the regime were severed and Islamist movements withdrew from the presidential alliance as a result of a clash between forces of political Islam and the regime[10].

In light of these developments, hereby, the study focuses on the reasons behind the crisis that took place after revolutions of the 2011 Arab Spring, as follows:

 

First – Reasons behind the crisis between the authority and forces of political Islam after 2011:

• As Islamists emerged after the 2011 revolutions, the Movement for the Society of Peace realized that the Arab Spring would bring things back to normal, therefore, it launched its political initiative on June 16, 2011 to test the waters among the public and call for a national comprehensive dialogue with the opposition to face the authority.
• The movement and the majority of its leaders chose to oppose the regime since Abderrazak Makri was elected leader of HAMAS, after the movement decided to withdraw from the alliance. Makri announced during his first week as the movement’s leader that he seeks an opposing Islamist alliance, and a change in the rules of Islamists parties in general[11].
• The reformations that were carried out by Bouteflika did more than double the number of Islamist parties, which managed to attract many Islamists who lost faith in HAMAS for allying with the regime for three terms. In addition, Islamist parties were able to found the “Green Algeria Alliance” for the Algerian legislative election, 2012.

 

Second – The reality of the crisis between the regime and Islamists (Studying the electoral status):

The legislative elections of 2012, the presidential elections of 2014, and the legislative elections of 2017 all show divisions and worsened relations between the authority and forces of political Islam in Algeria. During the legislative elections, Islamist parties announced challenging the authority’s parties, even during Parliament sessions, Islamist parties rejected most of the government’s drafts.

 

• The legislative elections of 2012 (A reading into the electoral process and its results):

The legislative elections of May 2012 expressed the first real clash between forces of political Islam and Bouteflika’s regime; the clash was represented in forming an alliance to confront the authority’s parties after disassociating from the presidential alliance, especially that this coincided the advancement of Islamists in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt[12]. In order to clarify this, this study analyzes the coalitions and party alliances that were formed by Islamists to face the two ruling parties, and how much did these coalitions succeed in achieving goals of Islamists.

 

• Coalitions and party alliances:

The Algerian legislative elections witnessed six Islamist parties, most of which are descendants of the Muslim Brotherhood’s school. Some of the Islamist parties that ran for the 2012 legislative elections are of old origins, while some others are the newly formed parties that the government allowed after Bouteflika’s constitutional amendments in April 2011. One of the oldest Islamist parties in Algeria then was HAMAS, which represented the main Muslim Brotherhood stream.

Moreover, the Green Algeria Alliance, was considered the most influential in Algeria; it had the ability to reap votes for its candidates. The alliance, however, failed to get the votes of the majority of Islamists who chose to support other Islamist parties, such as Abdallah Djaballah’s Movement for National Reform and Justice and Development Front, the Front for Change, and the Front for New Algeria.

 

• Participation and the general results of elections:

Actual results of the elections showed that the National Liberation Front managed to get 220 seats, 48% of the total seats, while the National Rally for Democracy (Liberal) came second with 68 seats. On the other hand, the Green Algeria Alliance got 48 seats, coming in the third place, and the rest of Islamist parties got seven seats for the Justice and Development Front, and four seats for the Front for Change[13].

 

• The parliamentary performance in the national legislative council:

The first direct confrontation between members of Islamist movements and the government occurred when Islamists objected results of the elections in May 2012[14]. Islamist parliamentarians also formed a strong opposition bloc that rejected the government’s first draft work program in Dec. 27, 2012. The bloc also clashed with the legislative authority as it slammed it in the final statement of the legislative council’s session in 2013[15].

 

• The April 2014 presidential elections (Tracks of the crisis):

The April 2014 presidential elections witnessed an escalation in opposing the regime after Bouteflika was announced running for a fourth term. The escalation took two following tracks, the first one was entitled “No to Bouteflika’s candidacy!”, while the second title, which appeared after Bouteflika showed signs of success, was “Down with Bouteflika![16]”; characteristics of the aforementioned titles can be defined as follows:

• During elections, Islamist parties boycotted elections after they failed to agree on a consensus candidate; their opposition to Bouteflika’s candidacy went into two directions:
• All the six Islamist parties, namely the Front for Change, the Movement of Society for Peace, the Movement of National Reform, the Renaissance Movement, and the Justice and Development Movement, were united against the presidential alliance. They agreed on rejecting Bouteflika’s candidacy for a fourth term.
• The Islamist forces also agreed with the civilian forces on rejecting Bouteflika’s candidacy and boycotting the elections; The opposition bloc, led by HAMAS, issued a statement that appraised boycotting the elections to “embarrass the regime.”

During the first year of Bouteflika’s fourth presidential term Islamist parties escalated opposition, as they demanded Bouteflika to step down and called for early presidential elections, pointing out that Bouteflika’s illness negatively affected the performance of state institutions and authorities. Furthermore, Islamist parties formed a bloc with the participation of some civilian forces that was called “Coordination for Liberties and Democratic Transition”, which called for early presidential elections due to “President Bouteflika’s incapability to fulfill his constitutional duties,” and demanded the application of article no. 88 of the constitution[17]. This specific article of the Algerian constitution stipulates, “If the President of the Republic, because of serious and long-lasting illness, happens to be incapacitated and cannot carry out his functions, the Constitutional Council shall meet de jure, and after having verified the reality of the impediment by the appropriate means, proposes, unanimously, to Parliament to declare a state of impediment.”

 

• The April 2017 legislative elections (Indications and results of the process):

Islamist parties managed to get 48 seats following the legislative elections of May 2017, as HAMAS got 33 seats, and the Algerian Movement for Justice and Development got 15 seats[18].

The block of Islamist parties came in the third place after the National Liberation Front (164 seats) and the National Rally for Democracy (97 seats), which represents the two main political powers in Algeria.

It is pertinent to mention that former prime minister Abdelmalek Sellal offered HAMAS’ leader Abderrazak Makri an enter to the government, however, the majority of members of the movement’s consultative council rejected Bouteflika’s offer to return to authority.

Forces of political Islam justified its rejection to forming an alliance with the authority as its demands were not met, the elections were manipulated, and because HAMAS refused the National Liberation Front’s statement that said it welcomes all coalitions, despite the fact that Bouteflika’s program was not negotiable.

 

The fourth pillar – The future of the crisis in light of new variables:

The study seeks to introduce a potential future of the crisis between the regime in Algeria and forces of political Islam through the scenario of continuation and change.

 

• The scenario of continuation:

This scenario indicates the continuation of the current situation that is represented in the conflict between the authority and forces of political Islam in Algeria. This scenario assumes that the authority stands its grounds in front of demands of the Islamist and civilian forces, while these forces will continue the united stand against the regime through the biggest opposition bloc against Bouteflika, namely “The Commission of Consultation and Monitoring of the Opposition”, which emerged during Bouteflika’s fourth term[19].

It is expected that the dispute between Islamists and the authority, which escalated its attack against the Coordination for Liberties and Democratic Transition as Bouteflika showed unprecedented aggressiveness towards the opposition during the end of the first year of his fourth presidential term, will continue.

The dispute is also expected to remain unchanged because these parties could not, and will never, be able to take advantage of the voters who voted for the Islamic Salvation Front in earlier electoral events. Therefore, forces of political Islam in Algeria will keep on threatening, protesting, and pressuring the authority to achieve their interests and prove their existence by calling for an early presidential election and amendments to the constitution.

 

• The scenario of change:

This scenario depends on the occurrence of a change within the Islamist opposition, which remained united since the legislative elections of 2017[20], or a change within the authority. The change within the authority could be done by achieving more reformations, making consensual constitutional amendments, or in case of a sudden change in the authority, or if the army had to interfere if Bouteflika did not determine a specific route after his departure. This scenario will lead to the division between Islamist and civilian opposition, after being united against the authority. In addition, the most important characteristics of this scenario are:

• The change indicates that the Rally of Algerian Hope (TAJ) will be performing what HAMAS used to do; the current authority might support this movement that backs Bouteflika in order to hinder Islamist opposition, which it could not contain or control. As a result, future divisions in relations between parties might happen; so, HAMAS might once again work with the authority, whether by satisfying or pushing it.
• The second change is related to the announced constitutional amendment, and Bouteflika’s arrangement of the identity of his successor; as more constitutional amendments will lead to giving a main role to the Parliament, and a great role to parties, which will result in division between the Islamist and the civilian bloc, leading to a weak opposition. In the end, the remaining Islamist parties will have no other option but to make reconciliation with the regime[21].

In the end, we can assume that coherence between Islamic forces in Algeria depends on several aspects, especially that these parties are still in formation, because they are the result of divisions within the two mother movements, namely HAMAS and Al-Nahda. And despite of the long shots of forces of political Islam with opposition parties, this depends on whether this cooperation will last.

[1] Ahmed Mehaba, “The Algerian Elections… Who won the fight?” – Al Siyassa Al Dawliya Magazine, E.129, July 1997, P.143

[2] Ismail Qira and others, “The future of democracy in Algeria”, The Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2002

[3] Abdelsalam Sakina, “Interior Ministry approves third party out of HAMAS’ womb”, Echorouk El Yawmi Newspaper, Aug. 6, 2014

[4] Abou el Fadl Al-Isnawy, “The interaction between the political regime and Islamist movements in Algeria in the period between (1999-2013) – an unpublished master thesis, Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Arab League, Cairo 2015

[5] Results of the 2004 presidential elections – Apr. 12, 2004 – www.boutflika2004.org

[6] Asharq Alawsat, results of the 2002 legislative  elections in Algeria: http://aawsat.com/home/saudi

[7] The National People’s Assembly, the outcome of legislative activity (2002 – 2007), Algeria: May 2007

[8] Tarek Ashour, “Obstacles of the Parliamentary experience in Algeria (1997-2011), a study into some political variables”, The Arab Journal of Political Science, E.34, 2012

[9] Mohamed Boudiaf, “The future of Algeria’s political regime”, Ph.D thesis, University of Algeria, Faculty of Information and Political Science, 2008

[10]  HAMAS’ leader statement on May 27, 2011 –  http://www.hmsalgeria.net/portal

[11] Latifah Belhadj, “The financial crisis is a proof that we are non-extortionable and do not sell our values: Makri”, Echorouk El Yawmi, Sep. 25, 2013 – http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/articles/179158.html

[12] Abou el Fadl Al-Isnawy, “The future of Islamist movements in Algeria after the shock of 2012’s parliamentary elections”, International Center for Futures and Strategic Studies, Oct. 2012

[13] Munir Mubarka, “The legislative elections in Algeria (May 10, 2012); a reading into the expectations, results, and repercussions”, The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Oct. 2012 – http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/7f020e1d-e774-47e0-b597-4365c469354b

[14] Al-Nahrda’s statement regarding the results of the May 2012 elections – http://www.nahda-dz.org/ar/

[15] Abou el Fadl Al-Isnawy, “The interaction between the political regime and Islamist movements in Algeria”, P.181

[16] Hameed Yasin, “Presidentials gather what leaderships dispersed”, El-Khabar Newspaper, Jun. 22, 2013

[17] Statement of the Coordination for Liberties and Democratic Transition on Jan. 15, 2015 – http://www.hmsalgeria.net/portal/communiques/4757.html

[18] Algeria’s Radio – Final results of the 2017 legislative elections – http://www.radioalgerie.dz/news/ar/article/20170518/112513.html

[19] Echorouk El Yawmi – “Will Islamist parties reach an agreement?”, Jun. 24, 2012

[20] Previous reference

[21] Ibrahim Abdullah, “HAMAS chooses Makri to reclaim its role in opposition”, Al-Ayam Newspaper, May 7, 2012