ISIS’ targeting of Copts in Minya will not revive the organization

It is striking that the declaration of ISIS usually comes quickly in the days between committing an attack and adopting it, and sometimes the attack remains without a clear adoption of its commission, such as with the attack against the Rawda Mosque in the city of Bir al-Abed in northern Sinai, which was committed in November last year and left more than 300 people dead.

The speed of adopting the attack is entirely consistent with the general view, where the organization’s attempt to “prove its existence” on the eve of the World Youth Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh. The forum brings together young people of different nationalities, serving as an additional indicator of the recovery of the Egyptian security situation. However, the terrorist organization tried to counter this by demonstrating that it still exists and is capable of launching operations against the Copts and those included in its concept of the “close enemy”, which in the Egyptian case includes “the regime, its organs and the Christians.”

Geographic range

The execution of the operation in the desert hinterland of Upper Egypt’s Minya governorate indicates the involvement of remnants of the ISIS of Upper Egypt group, which is led by the fugitive terrorist Amr Saad Abbas. This reflects the ability of these small groups, which are likely concentrated in the mountain paths, to launch more attacks. However, it is a limited ability linked to elements loose in rugged areas who are easy to catch.

This limited ability was overshadowed by the organization’s failure to storm the Mar Mina Church in Helwan in December 2017, where the security forces and citizens were able to paralyze the attacker. This was the last known attack that ISIS of Upper Egypt attempted to carry out before Friday’s operation. This means that this group needed 10 months to carry out an attack, an additional indicator of a decline in its physical and mobile capabilities.

On the other hand, the geographical scope of Friday’s attack is given another dimension, where the first organization in Sinai was neutralized from the theaters of operations, reflecting the great security success in undermining the organization’s capabilities and destroying its infrastructure in Sinai as a result of the Comprehensive Operation Sinai 2018 that was launched on February 9.

The last operation attempted by the organization in Sinai was on February 23, two weeks after the launch of Comprehensive Operation Sinai 2018. The attack targeted the headquarters of 101^st Battalion of the Border Guard Corps, but the armed forces were able to thwart the attack and kill four of the organization’s members.

Targets

Tracking the organization’s operations in 2017 and 2018 reveals the priority of soft targets versus the decline of military targets. A soft target is one that is easy to target, such as the bus of Copts on Friday and the worshipers at the Rawda Mosque in Bir al-Abed before, along with the civilians in Sinai in general due to their collaboration with security forces.

The focus on soft targets reflects a decline in tactical and physical capabilities, where targeting them would not need more than tracking targets, setting the zero hour, quickly escaping after the attack, providing a safe hiding place, and laying low for a period to avoid security after attacks. In contrast, a military target of the army or police, whether mobile or stationary, increases the organization’s margin of loss, whether any attack succeeded or was completely thwarted.

The terrorist organization’s human elements have decreased due the army and police forces arresting and killing dozens of them weekly, and its material resources have also declined with the destruction of a large part of the its infrastructure in Sinai and the tightening of security measures at all land and sea border crossings, especially with the Gaza Strip. All these factors have forced the organization to focus on soft targets.

Time range of the organization’s operations

The time ranges of the organization’s operations have diverged remarkably, as with the “seasons of attacks” during which it typically launched attacks, such as during religious seasons like Ramadan and the first ten days of Dhul Hijjah or national seasons like the 6^th of October Victory celebration, Sinai Liberation Day, and the anniversaries of the January and June revolutions, and so on. This is an indication of the nature of the phase that the organization seeks to revive, in which there are semi-weekly operations in Sinai and attempts to open fronts outside Sinai, such as ISIS of Upper Egypt, ISIS of Giza, and ISIS of Cairo. However, there is no possibility of this happening.

Afterwards, the organization needed about three months to launch major attacks, such as had happened at the end of 2016 with the attack on the Cathedral of St. Mark in Abbasiya and the twin attacks in April 2017 that targeted two churches in Alexandria and Tanta. The latest attack required a period of 10 months for the organization to commit attacks. Attacking the soft target bus of Copts in the desert does not reflect the organization’s prevalence but rather its retreat.

The attack on the Copts indicates the danger of the ISIS of Upper Egypt cell led by the fugitive Amr Saad Abbas, as opposed to the decline of the abilities of the parent organization in Egypt, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ISIS of Sinai). However, all security services are expected to interrupt this cell after Saad became the No. 1 wanted terrorist after the fall of Ashmawi in Libya last month.