American workshop predicted absence of Soleimani in April 2019

Robert el-Fares and Ahmed Adel

In April 2019, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, held a closed meeting on how to kill Qasim Soleimani, discussing developments that will happen in Iran after the killing of the Quds Force commander and reached a consensus that includes me on the killing of the Iranian general. American researcher Michael Knights summarized the discussions that took place in the session.

Backstage

Participants in the workshop agreed that Soleimani was of great strategic value to the Iranian government, which is dominated by the “Revolutionary Guard” for several reasons:

Nearing Khamenei

Before Soleimani came to the leadership in the Quds Force, he had nothing to do with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but after his appointment in 1998, Khamenei began to see him as a role model for the Islamic Republic.

Unlike other subordinates, Soleimani was obedient to the Supreme Leader and was highly effective. Khamenei influenced the intransigent vision that Soleimani presented – and was later influenced by him – of an armed Shiite cross-border movement in the event of a war with America, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

Risk:

The killing of Soleimani was clearly avoidable, but he accepted the risk by moving near the large conglomerates of US air and intelligence assets around Baghdad International Airport, at the same time precisely in which US officials warned through covert communications that they might kill him. However, his previous inclinations to take risks often boosted the regime’s regional interests.

Personal:

In addition to his attractiveness as a relationship manager and authority, Soleimani was well-liked by the media, as it seemed to have been created for the age of social networking via the Internet, and was particularly liked by Afghan militants.

Committed and consistent:

Soleimani worked hard to nurture his relationships with major stakeholders across Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and other conflict areas, and as a speaker in Arabic, he was respected by local agents and allies.

The role of Soleimani in the Quds Force:

Soleimani led the Quds Force, in recession, but thanks to his moves, he managed to transform it into an effective source to show power in Afghanistan, then Iraq, and finally in Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen, through his leadership style and focus.

Soleimani specialized in four main roles:

Coordination hub:

Soleimani was empowered to lead the entire Iranian government’s approach to dealing with regional intervention, with the help of his affinity with Khamenei, his personal dynamism, and his seniority. As a result, he could withdraw troops from the Revolutionary Guards and the traditional army and direct them toward unprecedented effective joint operations.

Practical fight:

Soleimani moved between the hot spots efficiently, attended personally and held key talks with partners as necessary, and he worked in the political field, where he visited the fronts of the fighting while he was easily mediating the appointment of Iraqi prime ministers.

Visible code:

Participants in the workshop were told that the emergence of the Revolutionary Guard force over the years in the region depends on two pillars: the rockets, and Soleimani, who is considered the face of the reconnaissance capabilities of the Quds Force.

Face inside:

Soleimani was the only officer who could appear confidently in Iranian protest sites where most of the Revolutionary Guards commanders had been expelled, and his reasonably positive image made him “unpopular” and thus formed a valuable bridge between the “Revolutionary Guards” and disaffected countryside residents.

Sudden succession:

In an article titled “The Surprise Caliphate” series by the Washington Institute, writer Martin Kremer emphasized that the main factor in assessing any transformation in the Middle East is summarized in the report “Where is the leader in the arc of his life, his career and his message.”

Here, the subject of Soleimani becomes more complicated, as there were indications that his golden touch began to abandon him before his death, and in the end, he may have fallen victim to his successes, along with his firm belief in his “infallibility” and his excessive assignment due to his effectiveness in the past.

Conclusion:

Researcher Michael Knights says the Quds Force did not stand idly by while Khamenei was placing his entire bet on Soleimani, as the new commander of the force, Ismail Qāni, knew closely Soleimani’s vision and would likely try to continue it.

However, something unique was lost with Soleimani’s death. The leadership unit he was able to achieve may deteriorate in the future. The operations of the Revolutionary Guards, Arch, and the Ministry of Intelligence may become less coordinated, and rivalries may reappear again.