Kadhimi and Iran: Will the former intelligence chief end mullahs’ influence in Iraq?

Nora Bandari

In a new development of the relationship between Tehran and Baghdad under the new Iraqi government, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi launched a violent attack on the Iranian militias and parties in Iraq, although without naming them, during his first press conference on Friday, June 12. He called for the need to protect the border crossings with Iran in order to eliminate organized militias and outlaws entering and to expel the militia representatives from the country, as well as to transfer the ports’ revenues entirely to the Iraqi treasury. This comes as a threat to the Iranian militias invading Iraq and controlling its wealth.

Iraqi threat

According to Gulf News, Iraqi Border Ports Authority head Omar Al-Waeli suggested that Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) protect the border ports, while the director of media for the Border Ports Authority, Alaeddin Al-Qaisi, announced that the request is still under study.

This comes after those close to the government announced that Kadhimi had already informed CTS head Abdel Wahab al-Saadi to prepare his forces to take over the border ports with Iran and to expel the representatives of the Iranian militias and parties. He noted that the revenues of the ports amounted to about $10 billion annually, of which only half a million dollars entered the public treasury, while the rest goes to finance militias linked to Iran.

During the conference, Kadhimi alluded to the fact that there are political parties that have worked to deceive the Iraqi people with the aim of toppling their government.

This comes as some religious parties in Iraq, particularly Hezbollah, have spread campaigns to discredit Kadhimi’s image within the framework of the government’s readiness for strategic dialogue between Baghdad and Washington expected to start on June 18, in which disarming the militias will be one of the most complicated files on the table.

According to a Foreign Policy magazine report in May, it is expected that Kadhimi will face a confrontation with the Iranian factions in Iraq, as Washington will ask the Iraqi government to curb the militias or face sanctions, as US President Donald Trump previously threatened to impose sanctions on Iraq by blocking its ability to access reserves if Iran’s agents continue to target American forces.

Kadhimi was appointed to head Iraq’s government in May, succeeding former Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, who submitted his resignation as a result of the popular protests demanding his dismissal in November 2019. Kadhimi had previously served as chief of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), and he managed to end the political parties’ domination of the service.

However, the mullah regime in Tehran believes that Kadhimi, by virtue of being a former intelligence officer, will maintain Baghdad’s good relationship with Tehran, maintain the growing role of the Iranian militias in Iraq, and reduce competition between Iran and the United States in the country, even though Kadhimi does not expressly favor Iran. He was also rejected by the Iranian-backed Iraqi Hezbollah militia before his government was approved.

Hezbollah described Kadhimi’s mandate to form the government as a declaration of war, calling on the political and popular forces in the country to reject him. The Iranian militia accuses Kadhimi of helping Washington kill Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who had founded the Iraqi Hezbollah militia, in a US strike in Baghdad in early January. The militia demanded that party members pursue those involved in the assassination of Soleimani, whatever their job description.

Pleasing the mullahs

Will Kadhimi change the course of the relationship between Baghdad and Tehran and get Iran and its militias out of Iraq, or will the mullah regime eliminate him before this can be achieved?

Osama al-Hetimi, a journalist specializing in Iranian affairs, explained to the Reference that Kadhimi’s assumption of the position of prime minister occurred with the agreement of the majority of Iraq’s political forces, including Shiites, despite what has been said about a dispute between Kadhimi and Iran due to what was reported about his role in the killing of Soleimani. This prompted Kadhimi to visit Beirut days before his appointment and settle his differences with Iran and those loyal to Tehran under the mediation of the Lebanese Hezbollah.

Kadhimi’s keenness to satisfy Iran means that Iranian influence will remain in Iraq, even if his appointment comes with US acceptance as well, Hetimi said. This way, two goals are achieved. The first is to avoid the popular protests that Iraq has witnessed over the past two years, as Iraqis are calling for an independent government that preserves Iraqi sovereignty, while the second is to mitigate the escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran on Iraqi soil.

Hetimi noted, however, that the extent of Kadhimi’s loyalty to Tehran does not reach the level of his predecessors ever since the first government was formed after the US invasion in 2003, meaning that his leadership will remain at stake as he is continuously tested to prove his ability to satisfy Tehran. Any abuses that could harm this consent will have consequences.

Talking about Kadhimi’s ability to weaken Iran’s influence in Iraq is ignoring the strength of this influence that has penetrated Iraq’s various political, economic, social, military and security fields for decades, which gives Kadhimi only two options. He can either continue on the path of his predecessors, enjoying limited space to express the divergence of his positions with some of what is going on in order to appear to be preserving Iraq’s sovereignty against any interference, or he can move along with efforts to reduce Iran’s influence, which would present him with enormous challenges that could reach the level of his assassination.