Erdogan holds onto Libya until last breath

Mostafa Salah

Turkey’s role in Libya has taken on different parallel trajectories, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan employs numerous political, economic and military tools to obtain influence in Libya and then the entire region. Since 2011, Turkey has been searching for a foothold in Libya after the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi fell, although its interference has witnessed changes in accordance with various domestic and regional conditions. Ankara’s involvement in the Libyan issue has been based on the economic dimension in order to protect Turkey’s economic interests in the country, estimated at $15 billion. With the declining ability of Libya’s Brotherhood-affiliated Government of National Accord (GNA) to confront of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Ankara moved to reinforce its political and military presence by signing a dubious agreement with GNA in November 2019 related to cooperation in maritime security and demarcating the maritime borders, as well as supplying weapons to militias affiliated with the GNA.

Shifting tactics

After the overthrow of the Brotherhood regime in Egypt in 2013, along with other countries in the region, Turkey tried to provide support to Libya, as it possesses great importance in influencing Arab countries, especially Egypt. Since then, Turkey has directed its policy towards surrounding Egyptian national security, showing a shift in the pattern of Turkish intervention in Libya and Turkey’s policy of providing support to armed organizations, represented in the Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and militias in the western city of Misrata. Previously, Ankara had provided support to armed groups belonging to Fajr Libya (Libya Dawn) to confront Operation Karama launched by the LNA in May 2014, which strained its relations with eastern Libya.

Since the beginning of the Libyan conflict, Turkey has supported armed terrorist groups there indirectly. For example, LNA spokesman Ahmed al-Mesmari announced in April 2019 that there are routes by air and sea from Turkey to provide military support to extremist groups in Tripoli, as well as direct flights to Misrata to transport militants from Nusra Front in Syria. In May 2019, two Turkish ships were detained in the Mediterranean carrying huge shipments of weapons, ammunition, military equipment and explosives.

After the LNA succeeded in taking control of many areas that had been under the control of GNA militias, Ankara signed a military and maritime cooperation agreement with the GNA that allowed Turkey to directly influence the course of the Libyan conflict. Under this agreement, Turkey has sent military advisors and soldiers to participate in military operations in Libya, in addition to increasing the flow of mercenaries loyal to Turkey from Syria, which represents a major shift in the pattern of Turkish intervention in Libya.

Goals

Turkey aims from its interference in the Libyan crisis to crowd out the growing influence of some countries in the region and the world in the crisis, and to face its negative repercussions on its influence and interests. The Turkish goals and motivations to engage in the Libyan crisis are intertwined with each other, some of which are specific to the Libyan state and its economic capabilities, while others are related to regional and international conditions. In any case, these motives are not separated from each other, but it can be said that they are an extension of each other.

In this context, Ankara seeks to take advantage of its presence in the Libyan crisis today and then benefit from reconstruction projects in the future, especially in light of the decline in the Turkish economy and its exposure to many domestic problems due to falling exchange rate of the lira and the high inflation rates. Turkey considers Libya one of the largest commercial markets that Ankara aims to provide with exports and establish economic projects, relying on more than 120 Turkish companies active in the country.

On the other hand, Turkey also seeks to guarantee its political and military control of Libya after the Brotherhood’s fall from power in Egypt in 2013, as it attempts to consolidate its influence in Africa, where Turkey seeks to possess military bases in Libya according to the security agreement signed with the GNA, while it already has a military base in Somalia and aims to acquire another base on the Sudanese island of Suakin. What is clear from Turkey’s colonial ambitions in this region is Ankara’s continued attempt to surround Egyptian national security from multiple sides.

Additionally, Turkey aims to ensure its share of energy distribution in the Eastern Mediterranean region, especially after recent discoveries of gas, which pushed Ankara to demarcate the maritime borders with the GNA, bypassing all international laws concerning the demarcation of maritime borders between countries. Turkey’s goals behind its interference in the Libyan crisis are not much different from its objectives in interfering in the various regional countries like Syria and Iraq, as the main objective is to continue to enhance its regional influence.

Threat continues

By adopting such policies, Turkey has worsened the conflict in Libya and created a new atmosphere of conflict with various manifestations in the Eastern Mediterranean over the newly discovered fortunes. Many countries have sought to confront Ankara’s aspirations, such as European Union countries, whose interests in the Libyan crisis conflict with Turkey’s. Tensions between Turkey and the EU have escalated in many regards, such as the Syrian file, the position of the Kurds, and Turkey’s relations with armed terrorist groups, in addition to the refugee file, posing a continued threat to European interests.

Turkey’s hostility towards many countries in the region, such as Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, has contributed to the sharpened criticism directed against Ankara. Its insistence on interfering in the Libyan crisis must be viewed in terms of its isolation in the Arab region after the Brotherhood lost the presidency in Algeria and Tunisia, became outcasts in Sudan after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, and are pursued in the Gulf, with the exception of Qatar. There is no longer another arena to control except Libya, so fighting until the last breath in Libya is Erdogan’s last hope in gaining a foothold in the Arab region.